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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Justice William O. Douglas declared that judges 
“do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation
nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the 
public welfare.”1  Eight years before, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
presaged Justice Douglas’s admonition in observing that “the
public policy of a state is for the legislature to determine and not 
the courts.”2  More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court echoed 
the warning, stating that “[t]his court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature.”3  Similarly, a court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency, even if 
the court may have reached a different substantive conclusion than 
the agency.4
In Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy v. Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency5 (“Boise Cascade”),6 the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals required the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(“MPCA”) to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) 
under the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”) on the 
expansion of a Boise Cascade Corporation paper mill.7  By
requiring that MPCA conduct an EIS, the court of appeals
substituted its judgment for that of MPCA and the Minnesota 
legislature.  The decision also offered an unpersuasive distinction 
of National Audubon Society v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
(“Potlatch”),8 a case that the court of appeals decided four years 
earlier involving strikingly similar facts.  Fortunately, the Minnesota 
1. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
2. Mattson v. Flynn, 13 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Minn. 1944). See also In re Karger’s 
Estate, 93 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. 1958) (opining that “[w]hat the law ought to 
be is for the legislature; what the law is rests with the courts”).
3. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993).
4. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1988). See also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (providing that a court may 
not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency”).
5. 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 
2002).
6. Because Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control
Agency, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (hereinafter Boise Cascade) and 
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1997) (hereinafter Potlatch) involve the same named defendant (MPCA) 
and a common plaintiff (the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy), this 
article’s short form citations for the cases reference the names of the defendant-
intervenors.
7. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 238.
8. 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Supreme Court recognized the intermediate appellate court’s 
error, and on May 23, 2002, reversed the decision of the court of 
appeals in Boise Cascade.9
MEPA requires state or local governments to collect
information regarding the environmental effects of a project that 
any governmental unit undertakes, permits, assists, finances,
regulates, or approves.  For projects whose environmental effects 
cannot be studied adequately on a case-by-case basis, the Minnesota 
Environmental Quality Board (“EQB”) may conduct a so-called
“generic” environmental impact statement.  In 1989, the EQB 
determined that the cumulative effects of timber harvesting in 
Minnesota could not be studied adequately in project-specific
environmental review, and ordered the preparation of the Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement on Timber Harvesting and Forest 
Management in Minnesota (“GEIS”).10  Completed in 1994, the 
5000-page GEIS evaluated the cumulative environmental effects of 
logging in Minnesota’s forests and recommended mitigation
measures to address those effects. In 1995, the Minnesota
legislature enacted the Sustainable Forest Resources Act (“SFRA”) 
to implement the GEIS recommendations.11
This article analyzes the challenges to MPCA’s application of 
the GEIS in Potlatch and Boise Cascade.  The article suggests that, 
despite a few flaws in the opinion, the court of appeals in Potlatch
correctly upheld MPCA’s use of the GEIS and the decision not to 
require a project-specific EIS.12  However, just four years later in 
Boise Cascade, the court of appeals ignored Potlatch, legislative 
policy, and the administrative record in holding that MPCA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in relying upon the GEIS and deciding 
not to require a project-specific EIS.13  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court properly reversed, but reached an erroneous conclusion 
regarding the incorporation of timber harvesting mitigation
measures into MPCA permits.  Justice Paul H. Anderson clarified 
the issue but, in an otherwise cogent and persuasive concurring 
opinion, incorrectly assumed that MPCA failed to rely upon the 
implementation of such measures in reaching its decision on the 
9. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 459.
10. See JAAKKO POYRY CONSULTING, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT STUDY ON TIMBER HARVESTING AND FOREST MANAGEMENT IN MINNESOTA 1
(1994) [hereinafter GEIS].
11. MINN. STAT. ch. 89A (2000).
12. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 219.
13. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
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need for an EIS.14  By reversing the court of appeals, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Boise Cascade demonstrated appropriate
deference to MPCA, adhered to the Minnesota legislature’s intent 
in enacting SFRA, and reaffirmed the analysis in Potlatch.15
II. THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, THE GENERIC EIS
ON TIMBER HARVESTING, AND THE SUSTAINABLE FOREST
RESOURCES ACT
A. MEPA Statutory and Regulatory Background
On May 19, 1973, four years after Congress passed the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),16 the Minnesota
legislature enacted MEPA.17  Modeled after NEPA,18 MEPA’s
purpose is “to force agencies to make their own impartial
evaluation of environmental considerations before reaching their 
decisions”19 by requiring state and local governmental entities to 
“use all practical means, consistent with other essential
considerations of state policy” to implement the statute’s policies.20
14. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 469 (Anderson, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 467-68.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).  NEPA applies to the actions of federal 
agencies. Id.
17. MINN. STAT. §§ 116D.01-.11 (2000).
18. See No Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 
323 (Minn. 1977) (observing that MEPA is “[p]atterned on NEPA”).  Minnesota 
courts often rely upon federal case law decided under NEPA in construing MEPA.
See, e.g., id. at 323 n.28 (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court has relied upon 
NEPA case law in interpreting MEPA); Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 237 N.W.2d 375, 380-81 (Minn. 1975) (relying in 
part upon NEPA case law in holding that decisions regarding environmental 
impact statements are subject to judicial review under MEPA); Iron Rangers Ridge 
Action v. Iron Range Res., 531 N.W.2d 874, 881-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (terming 
NEPA the “federal equivalent” of MEPA, and citing NEPA case law in analyzing 
impacts and mitigation under MEPA).
19. No Power Line, 262 N.W.2d at 327.
20. MINN. STAT. § 116D.02, subd. 2 (2000).  MEPA articulates nineteen broad 
policy goals, including fulfilling “the responsibilities of each generation as trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations,” preserving “important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain[ing],
wherever practicable, an environment that supports diversity, and variety of
individual choice,” and minimizing “wasteful and unnecessary depletion of
nonrenewable resources.” MINN. STAT. § 116D.02, subd. 2(a), (d), (l) (2000).
Section 116D.02 is very similar to NEPA Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331.  Although
NEPA Section 101 emphasizes important policy considerations, federal courts 
have held that the provision does not establish enforceable standards of conduct 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/13
FINAL LIGHTFOOT POTLATCH.DOC 10/28/2002 10:51 PM
2002] THE MINNESOTA TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS 441
MEPA applies to any “major governmental action”21 that may have 
the potential for significant environmental effects.22  The EQB 
promulgated regulations that implement MEPA’s environmental 
review requirements.23  Under the statute and the EQB rules, a 
and does not create a cause of action for failure to meet the goals described. See,
e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 
1971) (“It is true that the Act require[s] the government ‘to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources,’ but it does not 
purport to vest in the plaintiffs, or anyone else, a ‘right’ to the type of
environment envisioned therein.”), inj. dissolved and case dismissed 342 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff’d 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Bradford Township v. Ill. 
State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537, 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 
(1972) (“The declarations of a national environmental policy and a statement of 
purpose appearing in [NEPA] are not sufficient to establish substantive rights.  For 
these reasons, the plaintiffs have asserted no cognizable federal rights under these 
statutes.”); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 534 (S.D. Tex. 1972) 
(citing Envtl. Def. Fund, 325 F. Supp. at 755).  Similarly, Minnesota courts have 
rejected attempts to transform MEPA’s broad policy goals into substantive
standards or causes of action. See, e.g., In re NSP Red Wing Ash Disposal Facility,
421 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to imply from the broad 
statements of purpose in MEPA a guarantee of a “meaningful hearing” when other 
Minnesota regulations expressly provide the right to a contested case hearing);
Gleason v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, File No. MC 98-019439 (Hennepin County 
Dist. Ct.) (dismissing challenge to environmental review under the goals set forth 
in MEPA, MINN. STAT. § 116D.02, subd. 2, for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 
File No. C1-95-602306 (Cook County Dist. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996) (dismissing challenge 
to environmental review under the goals set forth in MEPA, MINN. STAT. § 
116D.03, subd. 2, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
21. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000).  A “governmental action” is an 
activity, “including projects wholly or partially conducted, permitted, assisted, 
financed, regulated, or approved by units of government including the federal
government.” Id. at subd. 1a(d); MINN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 33 (1999).  A 
“governmental unit” is “any state agency and any general or special purpose unit 
of government in the state including, but not limited to, watershed districts . . . , 
counties, towns, cities, port authorities, housing authorities, and economic
development authorities . . . but not including courts, school districts, and
regional development commissions other than the metropolitan council.” MINN.
STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 1a(e) (2000); MINN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 34 (1999).
22. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000) (“[w]here there is potential 
for significant environmental effects resulting from any major governmental
action, the action shall be proceeded by a detailed environmental impact
statement”). See also MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD, GUIDE TO
MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW RULES 1 (1998), available at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/pdf/rulguid3.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2002)
(discussing MEPA requirements) [hereinafter EQB RULES GUIDE].  In short, 
MEPA may apply if a project: (1) involves physical manipulation of the
environment; (2) will take place in the future; and (3) is conducted by, requires 
the approval of, or receives financial assistance from a local, state, or federal 
governmental unit. Id.
23. See MINN. R. ch. 4410 (1999).
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“responsible governmental unit” (“RGU”)24 discharges MEPA’s 
prerequisites by preparing and evaluating environmental review 
documents,25 and “complying with environmental review processes 
in a timely manner.”26  An RGU is typically the government or 
governmental agency with the largest role in approving or
supervising a project.27
MEPA mandates that governmental entities prepare an EIS 
where there is the potential for significant environmental effects 
resulting from any major government action.28  The EQB rules 
require an EIS for certain projects that, based upon location or 
character, make the potential for significant environmental effects 
highly likely.  If a project meets or exceeds the so-called
“mandatory” EIS thresholds established in the EBQ rules, the 
governmental entity serving as the RGU must prepare an EIS 
before undertaking or approving the project.29  Even if a project 
does not fall within a mandatory EIS category, an RGU must 
prepare a so-called “discretionary” EIS if the proposed project has 
the potential for significant environmental effects.30  The RGU 
must consider four criteria in determining whether a project has 
the potential for significant environmental effects: (1) the type, 
extent, and reversibility of the effects; (2) the cumulative potential 
effects of the project and related or anticipated future projects; 
(3) the extent to which the effects are “subject to mitigation by 
ongoing public regulatory authority”; and (4) the extent to which 
other available environmental studies may anticipate and control 
24. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 1a(e) (2000) (defining “governmental 
unit” as “any state agency and any general or special purpose unit of government 
in the state including, but not limited to, watershed districts organized under 
chapter 103D, counties, towns, cities, port authorities, housing authorities, and 
economic development authorities established under section 469.090 to 469.108, 
but not including courts, school districts, and regional development commissions
other than the metropolitan council”); MINN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 75 (defining
“responsible governmental unit”).
25. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000); MINN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 75 
(1999).
26. MINN. R. 4410.0400, subp. 2 (1999).
27. MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD, EAW GUIDELINES: PREPARING
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS 1 (2000).
28. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000); MINN. R. 4410.0200, subps. 1, 3 
(1999).
29. See MINN. R. 4410.2000, subp. 2 (1999) (stating that an RGU must prepare 
an EIS for projects meeting or exceeding the thresholds established in MINN. R.
4410.4400) and MINN. R. 4410.4400 (1999) (establishing mandatory EIS categories
and the RGU for each mandatory category).
30. MINN. R. 4410.2000, subp. 3(A)-(B) (1999).
6
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the environmental effects of the proposed project.31
Governmental entities consider whether a project has the 
potential for significant environmental effects by preparing an 
environmental assessment worksheet (“EAW”).32  If a proposed 
project meets or exceeds certain thresholds established in the EQB 
rules, an RGU must prepare an EAW;33 if not, an RGU may prepare 
an EAW if the proposed project “may have the potential for
significant environmental effects.”34  Ostensibly a “brief document 
prepared in worksheet format which is designed to rapidly assess
the environmental effects” associated with a proposal,35 an EAW for 
a complex project may include hundreds of pages of analysis.36
If a project’s environmental effects are not subject to adequate 
review on a case-by-case basis, the EQB may order preparation of a 
generic EIS.37  Among the criteria for determining whether a 
generic EIS is necessary are the regional and statewide significance 
of a project’s environmental effects, and the degree to which 
project-specific review is able to address such effects.38  Because 
traditional project-specific environmental review has limitations in 
31. MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(A)-(D) (1999).
32. See MINN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 1 (1999) (noting that the purpose of an 
EAW is to “aid in the determination of whether an EIS is needed for a proposed 
project” and to “serve as a basis to begin the scoping process for an EIS” if one is 
necessary). See also MINN. R. 4410.2100, subp. 2(A)-(B) (1999) (for projects that 
do not fall within the mandatory EIS categories, an EAW serves “to identify the 
need for preparing an EIS pursuant to part 4410.1700” and “to initiate discussion
concerning the scope of the EIS if an EIS is ordered pursuant to part 4410.1700”).
33. See MINN. R. 4410.4300 (1999) (establishing mandatory EAW categories 
and the RGU for each mandatory category).  The legislature may also expressly 
require an EAW for a project, even though the project does not meet or exceed a 
mandatory EAW threshold under Minnesota Rule 4410.4300 (1999). See In re Am. 
Iron & Supply Co., 604 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the 
Minnesota legislature passed a statute requiring that MPCA conduct an EAW on a 
metal shredding facility to determine whether an EIS was necessary).
34. MINN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 3 (1999).  A group of at least twenty-five
citizens may also petition the EQB for an EAW. MINN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 1 
(1999).  The petition must include “material evidence indicating that, because of 
the nature or location of the proposed project, there may be a potential for 
significant environmental effects.” MINN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 2(E) (1999).  If the 
EQB determines that the petition complies with process requirements, it forwards 
the petition to the RGU. MINN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 5 (1999).  The RGU then 
decides whether to conduct an EAW. MINN. R. 4410.1100, supb. 6 (1999).
35. MINN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 1 (1999).
36. See, e.g., Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 459-60 (noting that the EAW
involved was well over 100 pages).
37. MINN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 1 (1999).
38. MINN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 5(H) (1999).
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evaluating widespread cumulative environmental effects, a generic 
EIS is often a better instrument to address effects of regional or 
statewide concern.39  Although preparation of a generic EIS does 
not exempt particular proposals from MEPA’s procedural
requirements, an RGU must use information from a generic EIS in 
conducting project-specific environmental review.40  So long as the 
EQB “determines that the generic EIS remains adequate at the 
time the specific project is subject to review,” an environmental 
review document for a project related to the subject matter of the 
generic EIS “shall use the information in the generic EIS by tiering 
and shall reflect the recommendations contained in the generic 
EIS.”41
The EQB rules also exempt specific projects from
environmental review.42  For all projects other than “government 
activities”—which are defined as “[p]roposals and enactments of 
the legislature”—the exemption is qualified.43  Accordingly, if an 
otherwise exempt project meets or exceeds any of the thresholds 
for a mandatory EAW or EIS, the exemption does not apply.44  If 
the legislature exempts a proposed project, however, the project is 
not subject to environmental review even if it meets or exceeds the 
thresholds for a mandatory EAW or EIS.45
Judicial review of an RGU’s decision on the need for an EAW, 
the need for an EIS, and the adequacy of an EIS is available by a 
declaratory judgment action commenced within thirty days of the 
decision.46  Venue is in the district court of the county where the 
39. EQB RULES GUIDE, supra note 22, at 5.
40. MINN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 8 (1999).
41. Id.  “Tiering” means “incorporating by reference the discussion of an 
issue from a broader or more generic EIS.” MINN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 88 (1999).
42. See generally MINN. R. 4410.4600, subps. 1-26 (1999) (listing exempt
projects).
43. MINN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 26 (1999).
44. MINN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 1 (1999). See Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. 
Big Stone County Bd. of Comm’rs, 638 N.W.2d 198, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that an EIS was mandatory under MINN. R. 4410.4400, subp. 20 because a 
project eliminated a protected wetland, and as such could not qualify for the 
routine ditch maintenance and repair exception in MINN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 17).
45. See MINN. R. 4410.4600, subp. 1 (1999) (noting that the limitation to the 
exemption does not apply to subpart 26, the “governmental activities” exemption).
See also State v. Minn. Dept. of Natural Res.,  No. CX-93-2435, 1994 WL 193758 at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1994) (holding that the phrase “notwithstanding . . .
any other law to the contrary” in directing a sale of state land exempted the sale 
from MEPA environmental review under MINN. R. 4410.4600, supb. 26).
46. MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 10 (2000).  MEPA, MINN. STAT. § 116D.04,
subd. 10 (2000), specifically grants EQB the right to initiate judicial review of 
8
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proposed project would be undertaken.47  In reviewing decisions of 
administrative agencies under MEPA on the need for an EAW, the 
need for an EIS, and the adequacy of an EIS, Minnesota courts 
examine whether substantial evidence in the administrative record 
supports the decisions, and whether the decisions are arbitrary or 
capricious.48  MEPA also provides that “any person” may bring an 
action against the EQB or other unit of government failing to
undertake aspects of the environmental review process within the 
time specified under the statute, such as the statutory
requirement49 for completing an EIS within 280 days.50
B. The Generic EIS on Timber Harvesting and Forest Management in 
Minnesota51
Between 1980 and 1994, the level of timber harvesting in 
Minnesota increased from 2.3 million cords annually to 4.1 million 
cords annually.52  Spurred by the growth in harvest levels, a group 
decisions referred to in the section, and to intervene as of right in any proceeding 
brought under subdivision 10.  Aside from the EQB, Section 116D.04, subd. 10 
does not state who may bring an action under the section.  However, the language 
of subdivision 10 authorizing the EQB to “intervene as of right in any proceeding 
brought under this subdivision” suggests that parties other than the EQB may file 
actions under Section 116D.04, subd. 10. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464 (applying the standards of review
codified in the Minnesota Administrative Procedures Act, MINN. STAT. § 14.69, in 
reviewing a decision on the need for an EIS under MEPA).
49. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 11 (2000).  In addition to the two private 
rights of action discussed above, MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 13 (2000),
establishes the manner in which the EQB may bring actions to enforce MEPA.
Unlike MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 10 (2000), subdivision 13 does not contain a 
statement authorizing the EQB to intervene as of right.  The absence of an express 
right of intervention for EQB demonstrates that subdivision 13 is limited to EQB 
enforcement actions and does not allow private parties to bring an action under 
the subdivision.
50. See MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2a (2000) (requiring that an EIS be 
prepared within 280 days after notice of its preparation, unless the governor or the 
parties extend the time for good cause).
51. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail the entire Final 
Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Timber Harvesting and Forest
Management in Minnesota.  This section, which generally describes the framework 
and conclusions of the study, is intended to provide the background and context 
necessary for an understanding of the Potlatch and Boise Cascade decisions.
52. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, MINNESOTA MILESTONES 2002:
MEASURES THAT MATTER, Indicator 60 (Timber Harvest) at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/mm/indicator.html?Id=60&G=39 (last visited
Aug. 6, 2002).  Total timber harvest has been stable since 1995, fluctuating slightly 
between 3.7 and 3.8 million cords per year.  According to the Minnesota
9
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of citizens in July 1989 petitioned the EQB to conduct a generic 
environmental impact statement that would examine the statewide 
effects of timber harvesting and forest management.53  Minnesota’s 
project-based environmental review process under MEPA, the
petitioners argued, could not adequately evaluate the cumulative 
environmental effects of increased timber harvesting.54  The EQB 
agreed.55  In December 1989, the EQB unanimously passed a 
resolution directing the preparation of a timber harvesting and 
forest management generic environmental impact statement,56 and 
selected Jaakko Poyry Consulting, Inc. of Tarrytown, New York to 
conduct the study.57
When published in April 1994, the timber harvesting GEIS was 
unprecedented in the history of environmental impact statements 
in Minnesota.  The 5000-page study, which includes nine technical
papers and five background papers,58 took over four years to 
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), “[t]he drop in the timber harvest in 
1995 reflects an adjustment based on decreased use of firewood since 1989 and 
1990.” Id.
53. GEIS, supra note 10, at 1-4.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217-18 (“The GEIS was requested by
the Environmental Quality Board because the effects of timber harvesting within 
the state could not be adequately analyzed on a case-by-case, project-specific basis.
This is, in part, because it is not possible to identify the specific areas or stands of
timber that will be harvested and because the ownership of Minnesota’s available 
timberland is divided among a wide variety of groups and individuals.”); EQB
RULES GUIDE, supra note 22, at 5 (the potential for cumulative impact from a 
variety of specific projects “was one of the chief reasons why the EQB prepared a 
Generic EIS on timber harvesting activities”).
56. GEIS, supra note 10, at 1-4.
57. According to the GEIS, Jaakko Poyry Consulting, Inc., is a member of the 
Jaakko Poyry Group, “the world’s leading independent consulting and
engineering organization specializing in forestry and forest industry
development.”  GEIS, supra note 10, at liii.  Established in 1958 and headquartered 
in Helsinki, Finland, the Jaakko Poyry Group at the time it completed the GEIS 
employed nearly 6,000 people in over twenty countries. Id.  The Group “has a 
worldwide reputation as advisor to forest industries, national governments, and 
international agencies,” with particular expertise “in conducting environmental 
impact assessments and environmentally-based development plans for a region, 
based upon an objective, analytical, and comprehensive approach that includes 
estimating the economic impact of the recommendations.” Id.
58. As the GEIS acknowledges, the first step in undertaking such a study is to 
“identify and define the issues to be addressed,” a process known as “scoping” 
under MEPA. Id. at 1-6.  In early 1990, the GEIS Advisory Committee, see infra
note 61 and accompanying text, developed a draft report specifying the issues that 
the GEIS would address.  GEIS, supra note 10, at 1-6.  The EQB issued the report 
as a draft scoping document in July 1990, and solicited public comments. Id.
After receiving public comments and further recommendations from the Advisory 
10
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complete and cost the state of Minnesota $875,000.59  In addition to 
the consulting resources of Jaakko Poyry, more than sixty scientists 
in twenty disciplines prepared the GEIS.60  A ten-person advisory
committee, representing economic development, environmental, 
conservation, tourism, and public land management interests,
provided direction and oversight throughout the GEIS study
process.61
As the EQB directed, the GEIS analyzed and evaluated the 
potential significant environmental effects of three annual
statewide timber harvest levels.  The first was the “base” scenario of 
four million cords, which the EQB selected because it was the level 
of the statewide timber harvest in 1990—the most recent year of 
available data when the state prepared the GEIS.62  The second or 
“medium” scenario assumed an annual harvest of 4.9 million cords, 
which was the level of the statewide timber harvest that the GEIS 
estimated would occur by 1995 if certain announced forest
products industry expansions occurred.63  The third or “high” 
Committee, the EQB approved a final scoping decision for the GEIS in December 
1990. Id.  The nine technical papers addressed major issues that the final scoping 
document required the GEIS to analyze: (1) Maintaining Productivity and the Forest 
Resource Base; (2) Forest Soils; (3) Forest Health; (4) Water Quality and Fisheries; (5) 
Biodiversity; (6) Wildlife; (7) Unique Historical and Cultural Resources; (8) Economics
and Management Issues; and (9) Recreation and Aesthetics. Id. at 1-9 to 1-12, 2-27 to 2-
44.  For each issue, the technical papers provide a comprehensive record of the 
topics evaluated, assessment methodologies employed, and conclusions drawn 
regarding the subject matter. Id. at 2-28.  Two of the five background papers, 
Global Atmospheric Change and Recycled Fiber Opportunities, address factors identified 
in the EQB’s final scoping decision. Id. at 2-44 to 2-45.  Three others, Public
Forestry Organizations and Policies, Harvesting Systems, and Silvicultural Systems, provide 
background information on forest management and timber harvesting in
Minnesota. Id. at 2-45.  The GEIS integrates the conclusions drawn from the nine 
technical papers and the five background papers. Id. at 2-28.
59. Id. at 1-5 to 1-6.
60. Id. at liii-liv; 2-1 to 2-6.
61. See id. at 1-5 (noting that the total cost was divided among several public 
and private sources).  The EQB requested that the Advisory Committee advise the 
EQB on the scope of the GEIS and the selection of the consultant to prepare the 
GEIS. Id.  In addition, the EQB asked the Advisory Committee to review and 
comment on the consultant’s reports, the proposed draft GEIS, and the final 
GEIS. Id.  Finally, the EQB directed the Advisory Committee to provide
recommendations on alternatives for mitigating significant environmental impacts 
identified in the GEIS. Id.
62. Id. at ii.
63. Id.  In fact, the annual timber harvest in Minnesota has yet to approach 
the level of 4.9 million cords. See supra note 52.  Annual timber harvest in the state 
peaked at 4.1 million cords in 1993 and 1994. See supra text accompanying note 
52.  Since 1995, total timber harvest has been stable, fluctuating slightly between 
11
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scenario assumed an annual timber harvest of seven million cords, 
which the GEIS estimated was the maximum sustainable annual 
timber volume available for statewide harvest for all tree species in 
the year 2000.64  As the GEIS emphasized, the scenarios “are not 
recommended levels of harvest nor should their development and analysis be 
considered a plan[;]” they were simply “levels the study was asked to 
analyze to determine what the impacts would be if these harvests were to 
occur.”65
Modeling for each scenario predicted the “spatial and
temporal distribution” of timber harvesting by species that might 
occur throughout the state during the fifty-year planning horizon 
of the GEIS.66  The “primary data input” for modeling the three 
scenarios was the United States Forest Service’s Forestry Inventory 
and Analysis (“FIA”) database, which consists of nearly 14,000 one-
acre plots in forests throughout the state.67  After using the FIA 
information to map timber resources, the GEIS employed
computer models to assess projected timber harvests for the base, 
medium, and high levels, and to evaluate environmental effects.68
The GEIS then divided the state into seven areas called
“ecoregions,” and evaluated the cumulative statewide effects for 
each level of timber harvest by ecoregion.69  According to the GEIS, 
logging would occur in virtually all forested regions of the state, 
because Minnesota has a well-developed road network and a
decentralized timber industry.70
For the base scenario, the GEIS identified seventeen types of 
environmental effects by ecoregion across the state.  The effects 
included the projected significant loss of forest in four ecoregions, 
changes to the tree species mix that could affect biodiversity and 
wildlife habitat, accelerated erosion from forest roads, changes in 
3.7 and 3.8 million cords per year. See supra note 52.
64. GEIS, supra note 10 at ii.  The high scenario was the maximum level of 
harvesting that the GEIS estimated the state could sustain from a timber
production perspective only. Id. at xxix.  The GEIS did not evaluate the high 
scenario as a feasible level of statewide timber harvest. Id.  Rather, the GEIS 
employed the level as an analytical tool and concluded that, even “with the 
assumptions and constraints [of the study] applied, this level is not achievable on a 
sustainable basis.” Id.
65. Id. at ii.
66. Id.  The fifty-year period spanned the years 1990 through 2040. Id. at iii.
67. Id. at ii.
68. Id. at iii.
69. Id. at vi.
70. Id. at xxi.
12
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the population of certain forest-dependent wildlife, and the
development of permanent forest roads in otherwise undeveloped 
areas.71  For the medium and high scenarios, the GEIS concluded
that the cumulative effects would be of the same type as the base 
scenario, but the degree of the effects would be more
pronounced.72  “In particular,” the GEIS stated, “the high scenario 
suggests many impacts are large and would be left unmitigated.”73
To address the identified environmental effects, the GEIS 
recommended implementation of three categories of mitigation 
strategies.  The first category was “site-level” responses, intended to 
modify the procedures used in timber harvesting and forest
management on individual parcels.  These mitigation measures 
included adjusting harvest practices and equipment, altering
silvicultural practices, protecting sensitive sites, and increasing
forest productivity.74  The second category was “landscape-level”
measures requiring long-term solutions on a regional or statewide 
level.  These measures involved reducing the area of forest
converted to other land uses, safeguarding sensitive sites for plant 
species, and developing logging approaches in areas near bodies of 
water.75  The final category of mitigation was instituting forest 
resources research designed to obtain information necessary to 
undertake planning efforts, to monitor site-level and landscape-
level changes resulting from logging, and to provide forest
management and planning tools.76
After discussing mitigation measures, the GEIS concluded that 
the four million cord base annual harvest scenario was “sustainable 
in a broad sense” and could continue “indefinitely” while
maintaining other forest resource characteristics.77  The only caveat 
was that the state needed to implement the recommended
mitigation strategies “within the next few years” for the base level 
harvest scenario to be sustainable.78  Similarly, the 4.9 million cord 
medium annual harvest scenario was “sustainable in the long-term”
if the recommended mitigation was implemented “relatively soon” 
71. Id. at xxi-xxiii.
72. Id. at xxvii.
73. Id.
74. Id. at xxiii-xxiv.
75. Id. at xxiv-xxv.
76. Id. at xxv-xxvi.
77. Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
78. Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
13
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within the fifty-year planning horizon of the GEIS.79  Finally, the 
GEIS concluded that a harvest level of up to 5.5 million cords 
annually was sustainable without adversely affecting the state’s 
forests if “the loss of forest land projected in the north was halted, 
and substantial investments in forest management are made to 
improve productivity.”80  The GEIS warned, however, that this 
conclusion assumed that “the site-specific or other mitigations 
below the modeled level of resolution are implemented within the 
next few years and do mitigate otherwise significant impacts.”81
Reaching such harvest levels might also require the United States 
Forest Service to increase the “allowable sale quantities on the two 
national forests in Minnesota.”82
In addition to mitigation strategies, the GEIS endorsed four 
“strategic programmatic responses” offering policy
recommendations to implement the proposed mitigation measures
and to evaluate their efficacy.83  According to the GEIS, the state 
should first establish a “comprehensive Forest Resources Practices 
Program” that would serve as “an umbrella structure” for
implementation of specific guidelines to mitigate the
environmental effects of timber harvesting that the GEIS
identified.84  Second, the GEIS recommended a statewide
“Sustainable Forest Resources Program” that “transcend[s]
ownership boundaries” to successfully mitigate “unacceptable
landscape-level impacts from timber harvesting and forest
management activities.”85  Third, the GEIS encouraged a forest
resources research program to fill information gaps identified in 
the GEIS process, and to develop the information “needed to fully 
mitigate the projected timber harvesting and forest management
significant impacts.”86  Finally, the GEIS advocated formation “in 
advance of the other policy initiatives” of a Minnesota Board of 
Forest Resources.87  The board would be “the most appropriate 
administrative structure for implementing these [programmatic] 
79. Id. at xxviii.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at xxix.
83. Id. at xxix-xxxiii.
84. Id. at xxix-xxx.
85. Id. at xxx-xxxi.
86. Id. at xxxi-xxxii.
87. Id. at xxxiii.
14
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initiatives.”88
C. SFRA Statutory Background
In 1995, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Sustainable 
Forest Resources Act (“SFRA”)89 to implement the GEIS
recommendations.90  SFRA established a seventeen member Forest 
Resources Council, with the governor appointing the chair and 
fifteen members.91  The statute charges the council with developing 
recommendations to the governor and to federal, state, and local 
governments regarding forest management practices that will result 
in sustainable use and protection of the state’s forest resources.92
More importantly, SFRA mandates that the Council develop
guidelines that address the environmental effects of timber
harvesting by applying “site-level”93 forestry practices based upon 
“the best available scientific information.”94  Although the Council’s 
timber harvesting and forest management guidelines are
voluntary,95 SFRA requires DNR to monitor silvicultural practices 
and compliance with the timber harvesting guidelines “at the 
statewide, landscape, and site levels.”96  DNR must also oversee 
88. Id. at xxxii-xxxiii.
89. MINN. STAT. ch. 89A (2000).
90. See Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 463 (“In response to the Forestry GEIS, 
the Minnesota legislature enacted the Sustainable Forest Resources Act.”).
91. MINN. STAT. § 89A.03, subd. 1 (2000).  The Indian affairs council appoints 
the seventeenth member. Id.  The members appointed by the governor must 
include a variety of representatives, including two persons representing
environmental groups, two non-industrial private forest land owners, and a
representative from DNR, a conservation organization, the forest products
industry, a logging contractor, the tourism industry, a county land commissioner, a 
higher educational institution, the United States Forest Service, a game species 
management organization, a labor organization, and a secondary wood products 
manufacturer. Id.  As originally enacted, SFRA established a thirteen member 
council appointed by the governor only.  1995 Minn. Laws ch. 220, § 80.  In 1998, 
the legislature amended the statute to add an appointment by the Indian affairs 
council.  1998 Minn. Laws ch. 401, § 30.  The next year, the legislature amended 
the statute to read as currently codified.  1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 116.
92. MINN. STAT. § 89A.03, subd. 2 (2000).
93. SFRA defines “site-level” as “efforts affecting operational procedures used 
in the planning and implementation of timber harvesting and forest management 
activities on an individual site or local scale.” MINN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 12 
(2000).
94. MINN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 1 (2000).
95. Id. at subd. 3.
96. MINN. STAT. § 89A.07, subd. 2 (2000).  “Landscape” refers to a
“heterogeneous land area composed of interacting sustainable forest resources 
that are defined by natural features and socially defined attributes.” MINN. STAT.
15
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broad trends and conditions in the state’s forests and provide such 
information to the Council.97  The statute mandates that DNR 
evaluate the effectiveness of practices to mitigate the
environmental effects of logging on the state’s forest resources.98
These provisions ensure that DNR, a state agency with ongoing 
regulatory authority, monitors compliance with and the
effectiveness of the Council’s forest management guidelines.
In addition to DNR monitoring, SFRA requires the Council to 
monitor implementation of the guidelines.99  Should the DNR 
monitoring or other information indicate that the guidelines are 
not being met or that “significant adverse impacts are occurring,” 
the Council must recommend to the governor additional measures 
to address the adverse effects.100  The statute also creates a forest 
resources partnership of forest landowners, forest managers, and 
loggers charged with implementing the Council’s
recommendations “in a timely and coordinated manner across
ownerships.”101
SFRA addresses landscape-level102 effects by requiring the
Council to develop long-range strategic planning and coordination 
of forests owned by all levels of government, as well as industry and 
private individuals.103  To assist such planning, the statute
authorizes the Council to establish regional committees.104  The 
Council created eight regional landscape committees, each
representing a different area of the state.105  The regional
committees must report their accomplishments to the Council.106
§ 89A.01, subd. 9 (2000).
97. MINN. STAT. § 89A.07, subd. 1 (2000).
98. MINN. STAT. § 89A.07, subd. 3 (2000).
99. MINN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 3 (2000).
100. Id.
101. MINN. STAT. § 89A.04 (2000).
102. “Landscape-level” as used in the GEIS and SFRA means “typically long-
term or broad-based efforts that may require extensive analysis or planning over 
large areas that may involve or require coordination across land ownerships.”
MINN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 10 (2000).  “Landscape-level” contrasts with “site-
level,” which refers to effects from timber harvesting and forest management 
activities on an individual site or local scale. MINN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 12 
(2000).
103. MINN. STAT. § 89A.06 (2000).
104. Id. at § 89A.06, subd. 2 (2000).
105. See Minnesota Forest Resources Council website at
http://www.frc.state.mn.us/Landscp/Landscape.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
106. MINN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 4.  As originally enacted, SFRA did not specify 
reporting or action deadlines for the regional committees.  1995 Minn. Laws ch. 
220, § 83.  In the 1999 reauthorization, the Minnesota legislature added such 
16
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When originally enacted in 1995, SFRA was to expire on June 
30, 1999.107  In 1999 the legislature reauthorized the statute
through June 30, 2001,108 and in 2001 the legislature extended the 
sunset date through June 30, 2007.109  The 1999 reauthorization 
also contained several provisions that responded to the Council’s 
site-level forest management guidelines, adopted in December 
1998 and published in February 1999.110  The technical teams that 
developed the guidelines reached consensus on measures
addressing forest soils, wildlife habitat, and preservation of historic 
and cultural resources.111  The team preparing the riparian zone 
management guidelines,112 however, reached a “near consensus” 
deadlines.  1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 119, codified at MINN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 
2a.  The Council met these deadlines. See MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL,
SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 1999: ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 13-14 (2000) (Council completed work for the 
northeast landscape region by December 1, 1999, as required by MINN. STAT.
§ 89A.06, subd. 2a(1)); MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE
FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2000: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 13 (2001) (Council completed assessments for the 
north central and southeast landscape regions by July 2001, as required by MINN.
STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 2a(2)); MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE
FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2001: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 7 (2002) (Council completed draft desired forest 
conditions, goals, and strategies for the northeast and north central regions by July 
1, 2001, as required MINN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 2a(3)).  In 2001, the legislature 
amended SFRA to require that all regional committees complete their landscape 
assessments by June 30, 2002, and that the Council develop “desired future
outcomes and strategies” for all regions except the metropolitan and prairie 
regions by June 30, 2003.  2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2, § 102 (codified at 
MINN. STAT. § 89A.06, subd. 2a (Supp. 2001)).  The Council completed six
regional landscape assessments by June 2001, and is compiling assessments for the 
metropolitan and prairie regions. MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL,
SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2001: ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 7 (2002) at
http://www.frc.state.mn.us/info/mfrcdocs.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
107. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 220, § 142.
108. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 191.
109. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Special Sess. ch. 2, § 151.
110. MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINING MINNESOTA FOREST
RESOURCES: VOLUNTARY SITE-LEVEL FOREST MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
LANDOWNERS, LOGGERS AND RESOURCE MANAGERS (1999) [hereinafter COUNCIL
GUIDELINES].
111. See http://www.frc.state.mn.us/Fmgdline/Guidelines.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2002).  Technical team members included representatives from federal 
and state agencies, county land departments, universities, the forest industry, 
Native American tribes, loggers, conservation groups, environmental
organizations, the tourism and recreation industry, private landowners, and utility 
companies. Id.
112. “Riparian” areas or zones are areas of land and water that form a 
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because two of the team’s twenty members did not concur with the 
proposed guidelines.113  In the 1999 SFRA reauthorization, the 
legislature mandated that the riparian area guidelines undergo 
peer review by December 1999.114  The Council met the deadline, 
and is using information from the peer review process in
determining whether the riparian management zone guidelines 
need revision.115
In addition, the 1999 reauthorization requires DNR to
accelerate monitoring of the extent and condition of riparian 
forests and the effectiveness of the guidelines in riparian
management zones.116  The Council must also review and update 
the site-level forest management guidelines by June 30, 2003.117
When reviewing the guidelines, the Council must consider
information from the monitoring that DNR conducts under SFRA, 
and must subject any recommended revisions to peer review before 
adopting revised guidelines.118  Finally, the legislature directed the 
Council to establish processes in addition to Minnesota’s open 
meeting law119 in order to “broaden public involvement in all 
aspects of [the Council’s] deliberations.”120
To comply with the 1999 SFRA reauthorization, the Council 
approved a guideline review process in September 2001 and
requested public comment on the need for revisions.121  Council 
staff then identified potential guideline modifications based upon 
transition “from aquatic to terrestrial ecosystems along streams, lakes and open 
water wetlands.” COUNCIL GUIDELINES, Riparian Areas, supra note 110, at 3.
113. Id.
114. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 118 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 
89A.05, subd. 1 (2000)).  The amended statute defined “peer review” as “a
scientifically based review conducted by individuals with substantial knowledge 
and experience in the subject matter.”  1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 114 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 89A.01, subd. 10a (2000)).
115. MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES
ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN 2001: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE
15 (2002) [hereinafter COUNCIL’S 2001 ANNUAL REPORT].
116. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 118, codified at MINN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 4 
(2000) (requiring DNR to report to the legislature by February 2001 on the extent
and condition of riparian forests).
117. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 118 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 1 
(2000)).
118. Id. (codified at MINN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 2a (2000)).
119. MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1996) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§§ 13D.01-.07 (2000)).
120. 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 231, § 116 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 89A.03, subd. 3 (2000)).
121. COUNCIL’S 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 15.
18
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the results of compliance and efficacy monitoring under SFRA, as 
well as the riparian management zone guideline peer review.122
The Council weighed the public comments and staff
recommendations in early 2002 and expects to approve any revised 
guidelines by May 2003.123  In addition, as the 1999 reauthorization 
required,124 DNR submitted to the legislature in March 2001 an 
initial evaluation of riparian areas in Minnesota.125
III. THE TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS PROPERLY APPLIED—POTLATCH,
THE EQB, AND THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION IN BOISE CASCADE
A. The Potlatch Case
1. Background
The first case to construe the GEIS as applied to a specific 
project was the Potlatch case.126  In Potlatch, the St. Louis County 
District Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals applied an 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in reviewing an EAW that 
MPCA prepared for expansion of a Potlatch Corporation wood 
products facility.127  Both courts held that MPCA reasonably relied 
upon the GEIS in determining that a project-specific EIS was 
unnecessary under MEPA.128
Potlatch involved the expansion of a plant near Cook,
Minnesota, that manufactured oriented strand board.129  In June 
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
125. MINNESOTA DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, RIPARIAN FORESTS IN
MINNESOTA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (2001).  In June 2002, DNR submitted
another report to the legislature that estimated timber harvest in riparian areas by 
using sophisticated satellite imagery in combination with aerial photography. See
COUNCIL’S 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 10-15.
126. 569 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).  The author represented 
defendant-intervenor Potlatch Corporation in the litigation.
127. Id. at 215-16, 217.
128. Id. at 217-18.
129. “Oriented strand board” is a sheeting product used in the building
industry manufactured from wood flakes.  At the Potlatch facility, tree-length
timber is cut into 100-inch logs and the bark is removed.  The wood is then shaved 
into thin stands approximately ¾-inch wide by three inches long.  Potlatch mixes 
the strands with resins and wax in a blending drum, places or “orients” the strands 
onto sheets in layers to form a mat, presses the mats to a predetermined thickness
in a high-temperature press, cuts the pressed board into finished sizes, and 
19
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1995, Potlatch Corporation sought approval from MPCA to expand 
the facility and roughly double production, enabling the facility to 
process an additional 177,000 cords of wood annually.130  Potlatch 
Corporation estimated that ninety percent of the wood for the 
proposed expansion was available within a 150-mile radius from the 
Cook facility, which included the counties of Itasca, Koochiching, 
Lake, and St. Louis.131  Potlatch Corporation applied for an
amendment to the Cook facility’s Clean Air Act emissions permit to 
reflect the expansion and MPCA, as the RGU under MEPA,
prepared an EAW for the project.132  During the EAW process, 
MPCA requested the assistance of the Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources (“DNR”) in reviewing timber harvesting issues, 
and in preparing responses to comments on the EAW related to 
forestry and wildlife management.133
packages the product for shipment.  MPCA, Environmental Assessment Worksheet
for Potlatch Oriented Strand Board Plant Expansion, Cook, Minnesota, at 2-3 (July 
26, 1995) [hereinafter Potlatch EAW] (Appellants’ Appendix at A-150 to A-151,
Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
130. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214. See also Potlatch EAW at 3 (Appellants’ 
Appendix at A-151, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-
391)).
131. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214. See also Potlatch EAW, Appendix 1 at 3 
(Appellants’ Appendix at A-182, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(No. C5-97-391)).  Although Potlatch’s Resource Availability Study determined 
that wood for the expansion was available within a 150-mile radius, Potlatch 
Corporation often procured wood from Canada, Wisconsin, and locations in 
Minnesota well outside the 150-mile radius from the Cook facility.  Potlatch 
Minnesota Wood Products Division, Cook OSB Plant Expansion, Resource
Availability Study, at 14-15 (Respondent’s Appendix at A-158-59, Potlatch, 569 
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).  Given the dynamic nature of 
the wood market, only general assumptions are possible regarding where timber 
harvesting might occur.  As Gerald Rose, DNR’s Directory of Forestry, testified 
before the MPCA Citizen’s Board when it considered the Potlatch EAW, “wood 
procurement is very dynamic in the State of Minnesota and an increase in 
consumption in a given local[e] will spread throughout the state; in other words, if 
somebody can pay more, the market will determine where the wood will come 
from.”  Transcript of MPCA Citizen’s Board Meeting, Nov. 28, 1995, at 17
(Respondent’s Appendix at A-25, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(No. C5-97-391)).
132. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214.  The EQB’s environmental review rules
required MPCA to prepare an EAW because the project was predicted to increase 
the generation of a regulated air pollutant emitted by the expanded Potlatch 
facility by 100 tons or more per year. See MINN. R. 4410.1000, subp. 2 (1999) and 
MINN. R. 4410.4300, subp. 15.A (1999).  For such projects, the EQB rules specify 
that MPCA is the RGU. MINN. R. 4410.4300, subp. 15.A (1999).
133. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214.  The Potlatch court made a factual error in 
stating that MPCA “delegated” its responsibility for evaluating the effects of
increased timber harvesting to DNR. See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying 
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MPCA, with DNR’s assistance, prepared a thirty-one page EAW 
and a nineteen-page appendix.  The EAW focused on analyzing the 
effects of the increased wood harvest associated with the Potlatch 
expansion.134  In July 1995, as required by the environmental review 
rules,135 MPCA solicited public comments on the EAW.136  MPCA 
received twenty-seven comments, most addressed to timber
harvesting issues, from private citizens, environmental groups, and 
government agencies.137  At the request of MPCA, the DNR
prepared a thirty-six page response to comments directed at the 
Potlatch project’s effects on the state’s forests.138  MPCA then 
reviewed all of the information gathered in the EAW process, 
including the GEIS, to assess whether the Potlatch project had “the 
potential for significant environmental effects” and required an 
EIS.139  On November 28, 1995, the MPCA Citizen’s Board voted 
eight-to-one not to require a project-specific EIS for the Potlatch 
expansion.140  Two weeks later, MPCA issued a modified air
emissions permit authorizing Potlatch Corporation to construct 
and operate the expanded Cook facility.141
2. Potlatch in the District Court
On December 22, 1995, four environmental groups, led by the 
National Audubon Society, filed a four-count complaint against 
MPCA in St. Louis County District Court.142  Count one alleged that 
MPCA violated MEPA by failing to require an EIS for the Potlatch 
Cook expansion project.143  Count two alleged that the Potlatch 
text.
134. Potlatch EAW at 2, 5, 20-22 and Appendix at 1-19 (Appellants’ Appendix 
at A-150, A-153, A-168 to A-170, and A-180 to A-198, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
135. MINN. R. 4410.1500 , 4410.1600 (1993).
136. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214; Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 3, Potlatch, 569 
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).
137. Id.
138. Potlatch EAW Attachment 4, Comments and Responses on Timber
Harvest Issues (Appellants’ Appendix at A-199 to A-234, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
139. See MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 1 (1993) (“An EIS shall be ordered for 
projects that have the potential for significant environmental effects.”).
140. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214-15; Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 4, Potlatch,
569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).
141. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.
142. Id.
143. In particular, count one alleged that MPCA violated MINN. STAT. § 
116D.04, subd. 2a, which requires that “[w]here there is a potential for significant
21
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expansion would cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of 
protected natural resources in Minnesota under MEPA.  Count two 
also maintained that such action and the existence of feasible 
alternatives violated MEPA.144  Count three asserted that MPCA 
violated MEPA by failing to consider adequate protective measures 
to mitigate the Potlatch expansion’s project-specific effects.145
Count four alleged that the Potlatch expansion would cause
pollution, impairment, or destruction of protected natural
resources under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
(“MERA”),146 thereby violating MERA.147  Potlatch Corporation 
intervened, and MPCA and Potlatch then moved to dismiss counts 
two, three, and four for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.148  The district court granted the motion to 
dismiss.149  The parties then brought cross-motions for summary 
environmental effects resulting from any major governmental action, the action 
shall be preceded by a detailed environmental impact statement prepared by the 
responsible governmental unit,”  as well as MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 2a(A), 7(A), 
which provide that an RGU must require an EIS if it determines information
regarding a project’s environmental effect is missing, and sets forth four criteria
for determining whether a project has the “potential for significant environmental
effects.”  Complaint at ¶¶ 64-68, Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control 
Agency (Cook County Dist. Ct. 1996) (No. C1-95-602306).
144. Id. at ¶¶ 69-72 (citing MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 4 for the “pollution, 
impairment, or destruction of protected natural resources” and MINN. STAT.
§ 116D.04, subd. 6 for the “existence of feasible alternatives”).
145. Id. at ¶¶ 73-76 (citing MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2).
146. Id. at ¶ 78 (citing MINN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 4, which defines
“[p]ollution, impairment or destruction” as “any conduct by any person which 
violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, 
order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit . . . or any conduct which
materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the
environment . . . .”).
147. Id. at ¶ 79 (citing MINN. STAT. § 116B.03, subd. 1, which authorizes “any 
person residing within the state” to bring a civil action in district court for 
declaratory or equitable relief against any other person for “the protection of the 
air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the state, whether 
publicly or privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction . . . .”).
148. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.
149. Potlatch, File No. C1-95-602306 (St. Louis County Dist. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996).
With respect to count two, the district court held that environmental review did 
not constitute a “state action” approving a project, and that plaintiffs did not have 
a cause of action under MEPA, MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 6 (1994).  The 
district court also dismissed count three, holding that the goals set forth in MEPA, 
MINN. STAT. § 116D.03, subd. 2 (1994), did not create a cause of action.  The 
district court dismissed count four because MPCA’s conduct of environmental 
review under MEPA did not cause “pollution, impairment, or destruction” of the 
state’s natural resources, and could not give rise to a MERA action under MINN.
STAT. § 116B.03 (1994).
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judgment on count one, which challenged MPCA’s decision not to 
require an EIS for the Potlatch expansion project.150
In support of its motion for summary judgment, MPCA argued 
that it analyzed whether the Potlatch expansion required a project-
specific EIS based upon MEPA’s four criteria for determining the
“potential for significant environmental effects.”151  In particular, 
MPCA maintained that the EAW and the GEIS fully addressed the 
type of environmental effects associated with the Potlatch
expansion.152  MPCA also argued that the environmental effects of 
the Potlatch expansion were subject to “mitigation by ongoing 
public regulatory authority” because SFRA required the Forest 
Resources Council, under the oversight of the DNR, to implement 
the mitigation measures outlined in the GEIS.153  The GEIS, MPCA 
contended, demonstrated that the effects of the Potlatch expansion 
could be anticipated and controlled “as a result of other available 
environmental studies.”154  MPCA concluded that, under the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, the administrative 
record provided substantial evidence to support its decision that 
EAW and the GEIS adequately assessed the effects of increased 
timber harvesting associated with the Potlatch expansion, and that 
an EIS for the expansion project alone was unnecessary.155
The environmental groups countered that MPCA
“systematically excluded adverse agency opinion” from the
administrative record, and that MPCA’s failure to consider the 
objections of DNR’s Fish and Wildlife Division was arbitrary and 
capricious.156  Documents that the environmental groups obtained 
through the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act157 revealed 
that although the DNR’s Forestry Division did not believe that the 
Potlatch expansion warranted a project-specific EIS, the DNR’s Fish 
and Wildlife Division did recommend an EIS for the project.158
150. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.
151. MPCA’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 13-21, Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306).  For the four criteria, see supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
152. Id. at 13-15, referencing MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(A), (B) (1993).
153. Id. at 16-18, referencing MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C) (1993).
154. Id. at 18-19, referencing MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(D) (1993).
155. Id. at 2-4, 19-21.
156. Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-26,
Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306)(hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief).
157. MINN. STAT. ch. 13 (1994).
158. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 17-23.  Plaintiffs initially sought discovery that included 
internal DNR Division of Fish and Wildlife documents relating to the Potlatch 
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Ultimately, the DNR Commissioner resolved the conflict, declared 
DNR’s official position that the Potlatch project did not require an 
EIS, and did not submit to MPCA the internal Forestry Division 
documents drafted during the EAW process.159  The environmental 
groups argued that (1) the MPCA “arbitrarily cut the DNR Division 
of Fish and Wildlife out of the [Potlatch EAW] process;”160 (2) the 
district court should consider the Fish and Wildlife Division’s
documents “excluded” from the administrative record;161 (3) the 
GEIS mitigation measures relied upon in the Potlatch EAW were 
voluntary and unimplemented;162 and (4) the GEIS did not
“anticipate” the effects of the Potlatch expansion, and thus could 
not substitute for a project-specific EIS.163
MPCA responded that when it decided a project-specific EIS 
was unnecessary, the DNR Fish and Wildlife Division documents 
were not in MPCA’s possession, and therefore were not part of the 
administrative record.164  Moreover, MPCA contended that it was
not arbitrary and capricious for the agency to rely upon DNR’s 
official position on the need for an EIS.165  Furthermore, the 
administrative record addressed all of the substantive objections 
raised in the Fish and Wildlife Division documents.166  With respect
to mitigation, MPCA argued that many of the GEIS mitigation 
strategies, which the state would implement under SFRA, would be 
in place before construction of the Potlatch project.  It further 
argued that the GEIS envisioned mitigation could take years or
expansion.  MPCA moved for a protective order, which the district court granted.
The district court held that discovery was available in challenges to administrative 
decisions only where “there is a sufficient showing that there have been
procedural irregularities in the administrative proceeding or when the
administrative record is clearly inadequate,” and that plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate such irregularities or inadequacy. Potlatch, File No. C1-95-602306, at 
4 (St. Louis County Dist. Ct. June 14, 1996).  MPCA, however, invited the plaintiffs 
to request the DNR Division of Fish and Wildlife documents under the
Government Data Practices Act, and the plaintiffs obtained the documents directly 
from DNR under the Act.  Plaintiffs’ Brief at 7-8.
159. MPCA’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5-8, Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306).
160. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 20.
161. Id. at 23-26.
162. Id. at 26-35.
163. Id. at 35-41.
164. MPCA’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4-8, Potlatch (No. C1-95-602306).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 8-11.
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decades as the forests regenerated.167  MPCA also asserted that it 
used the cumulative effects analysis in the GEIS precisely as the 
GEIS drafters intended.168  According to MPCA, a project-specific
EIS would provide no additional information because it was
impossible to predict the exact location of logging associated with 
the Potlatch project.  Moreover, a project-specific EIS would rely 
upon the same database as the GEIS to predict timber-harvesting
effects.169
The district court granted MPCA’s summary judgment motion, 
observing that “[p]laintiffs’ entire case rests upon the [DNR Fish 
and Wildlife Division] documents submitted over objection which 
are outside the administrative record.”170  After spending
“considerable time” reviewing the documents, the court concluded
that they did not “show some sort of ‘record sanitizing’ by state 
agencies in order to achieve a slanted and predictable result.”171
MPCA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by relying upon 
DNR’s official position, the court held, and “[t]he fact that there 
was dissent within the DNR from that agency’s final decision does 
not render the decision unlawful.”172  Although the district court 
did not expressly address the mitigation issue, it opined that given 
the “million-dollar GEIS was put together” to address the effects of 
timber harvesting, “[s]till another study . . . with no real way of 
making it site-specific, seems of little worth[.]”173  Plaintiffs
appealed,174 correctly noting that the district court did not discuss 
167. Id. at 21-32.
168. Id. at 11-20.
169. Id.  The primary database for the GEIS was the United States Forest 
Service’s Forest Inventory and Assessment (FIA) plots, a series of 13,536 one-acre
forest parcels randomly located throughout the state’s forests. See supra note 67 
and accompanying text.  MPCA argued that any EIS for the Potlatch expansion 
“would require use of the same primary data inputs (i.e., FIA data) and modeling 
technologies applied in the GEIS,” ensuring that “an EIS for the Potlatch
expansion project would essentially replicate the work of the GEIS and produce 
similar, if not identical information on cumulative timber harvesting impacts.”
MPCA’s Response Brief at 18.
170. Findings and Order for Summary Judgment at 1, Potlatch, (St. Louis
County Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 1996) (No. C1-95-602306).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 2.
174. In addition to appealing the district court’s order granting MPCA
summary judgment on the claim regarding the need for an EIS, the
environmental groups appealed the district court’s decision to dismiss the claim 
alleging that MPCA violated MERA. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 215.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the district court, holding that “MERA may not be used to seek 
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the mitigation issue, but incorrectly asserting that the district court 
“confined its review to the question of whether the MPCA compiled 
a one-sided and self-serving account of the potential impacts of the 
proposed expansion.”175
3. Potlatch in the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the parties in Potlatch essentially reiterated the 
arguments made before the district court in the cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The environmental groups, relying upon their 
primary argument in the district court, maintained that MPCA 
excluded the DNR Fish and Wildlife Division’s objections to the 
Potlatch EAW, thereby providing an administrative record that 
“gave the public and the MPCA Citizens’ Board the illusion of 
consensus.”176  Although appellants’ public comments raised the 
same issues found in the DNR Fish and Wildlife Division
documents, the environmental groups claimed that MPCA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to “inform agency decision 
makers that the DNR, not just the general public, was deeply 
divided on whether to recommend preparation of an EIS.”177  The 
environmental groups also claimed that the SFRA mitigation
measures were illusory, voluntary, and could not constitute
“mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority” under MEPA.178
Finally, the environmental groups suggested that MPCA used the 
GEIS to “evade” project-specific review of the Potlatch expansion; a 
project-specific EIS would provide “important new information” 
and afford the state an opportunity to evaluate alternatives to the 
expansion.179
review of an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS, because MEPA is the 
appropriate avenue for review of such decisions.” Id. at 219.
175. Statement of the Case of Appellants at 10, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).  Appellants maintained that “[o]n the 
issue of whether the GEIS supplants the need for project-specific review, the 
[district court] said nothing.” Id.  In actuality, the district court explicitly stated 
that given the GEIS, a project-specific EIS on timber harvesting “seems of little 
worth[.]”  Findings and Order for Summary Judgment at 2, Potlatch, (St. Louis
County Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 1996) (No. C1-95-602306).
176. Appellants’ Brief at 20, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(No. C5-97-391).
177. Id. at 25.
178. Id. at 32-39.
179. Id. at 39-46.  As appellants noted, an EIS requires an examination of 
alternatives to a proposed action, whereas an EAW does not. Id. at 46 (citing 
MEPA, MINN. STAT. § 116D.04, subd. 2(a) (1994)).
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In response, MPCA contended it reasonably relied upon
DNR’s official comments, and that those comments discussed the 
issues regarding GEIS modeling and mitigation that the internal 
Fish and Wildlife Division documents outlined.180  MPCA also 
maintained that the EAW identified ten potential environmental
effects related to timber harvesting associated with the Potlatch 
expansion, and outlined specific mitigation measures to address 
those effects.181  In addition, MPCA argued that the Minnesota 
legislature enacted SFRA in response to the GEIS, that SFRA 
created the Minnesota Forest Resources Council to implement the 
GEIS mitigation strategies, and that SFRA required DNR to
monitor mitigation compliance.182  According to MPCA, the
environmental groups failed to offer databases or modeling
technologies superior to those in the GEIS.183  MEPA expressly 
requires the use of generic EIS information in project-specific
environmental review, MPCA argued, and does not require an 
RGU “to conduct studies endlessly.”184
In a thoughtful opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the 
district court.  Recognizing that DNR was “deeply divided on the 
issue of whether to recommend the preparation of an EIS,” the 
court nevertheless found that MPCA acted appropriately in relying 
“on the official opinion of the DNR submitted during the public 
comment period.”185 The court stated that requiring an
administrative agency to “look beyond the official comment issued 
by another commenting agency” would “require a reviewing agency 
to interject itself, we think improperly, into the internal debate of 
the commenting agency.”186  The court also found that because the 
EAW “target[ed] specific mitigation measures that have been or 
180. Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 34-39, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391).
181. Id. at 22-31.
182. Id. at 32-34.
183. Id. at 21.  As it argued in the district court, MPCA maintained that a 
project-specific EIS for the Potlatch expansion would analyze the same United 
States Forest Service FIA plots that the GEIS relied upon, and that “[t]here is 
simply no evidence that a better database or modeling technology is available to 
study the effects of increased timber harvesting from Potlatch’s expansion.” Id.
184. Id. at 12-13 (citing MINN. R. 4410.3800, subp. 8 (1995)) (requiring
project-specific environmental review to use the information and recommendation 
in a generic EIS if EQB determines that the generic EIS “remains adequate at the 
time the specific project is subject to review”).
185. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 216.
186. Id.
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will soon be implemented that address the environmental impacts 
associated with the Potlatch expansion,”187 the mitigation measures 
were more than “mere vague statements of good intentions.”188  In 
addition, the court found that it was “questionable whether a 
project-specific EIS would provide information substantially
different from or better than that contained in the GEIS.”189
Ownership of the state’s forests “is divided among a wide variety of 
groups,” and the “harvest of any timber stand depends on the 
discretion of the specific landowner.”190  As a result, the court 
opined, “there does not appear to be any meaningful way to
identify the specific 7,600 acres of timberland likely to be harvested 
from the 6,297,000 acres available for commercial timber
harvesting in the four-county Potlatch wood procurement zone.”191
According to the court, the EQB prepared the GEIS precisely 
because the effects of timber harvesting “could not be adequately 
analyzed on a case-by-case, project-specific basis.”192  The court 
concluded that MPCA used the GEIS properly, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court denied the environmental groups’ petition for 
review of the court of appeals’ decision.
4. Evaluating the Potlatch Decision
In Potlatch, the court of appeals offered a rational and well-
considered discussion of the challenge to MPCA’s use of the GEIS.
The court found that substantial evidence in the administrative
record, which included the Potlatch EAW and the GEIS by
reference, supported MPCA’s decision not to require a project-
specific EIS.  As a result, the court properly held that MPCA’s 
actions were reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
There are, however, three significant flaws in the Potlatch
opinion.  The first is the court’s declaration that “it is questionable
whether a project-specific EIS would provide information
substantially different from or better than that contained in the 
GEIS.”193 Although the court’s conclusion was correct, use of the 
187. Id. at 217.
188. Id. (citing Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Res.,
531 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) and Audubon Soc’y v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 
428, 436 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217.
190. Id. at 218.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 217.
193. Id. (emphasis added).
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term “questionable” does not accurately reflect the administrative 
record.  As the DNR’s official comments on the Potlatch expansion 
explained, “[i]t is doubtful to expect that a site-specific EIS for this 
project would produce substantially more insightful information on 
cumulative timber and non-timber impacts and mitigations than is 
contained in the GEIS.”194  This was true in part because, as the 
court recognized, it was impossible to identify the specific stands of 
timber to be harvested as a result of the Potlatch expansion.195
More significant, however, was the DNR’s conclusion that the GEIS 
“provides an analysis of potential environmental effects and
anticipates applicable mitigations associated with harvest levels 
encompassing the proposed Potlatch expansion.”196  In analyzing 
the potential effects of timber harvesting and measures to mitigate 
those effects, the GEIS evaluated the same information that the 
MPCA and DNR would consider in conducting a project-specific
timber harvesting EIS for the Potlatch expansion.197  The
administrative record, therefore, established that it was much more 
than “questionable” whether an EIS would have provided different 
or better information than the GEIS.  Rather, the administrative
record reflected that an EIS on timber harvesting associated with 
the Potlatch expansion would have duplicated the work and the 
conclusions of the four-year, $875,000 GEIS.
The second flaw in the Potlatch opinion is the court’s failure to 
analyze the “ongoing regulatory authority” component of
mitigation.  According to the court, MPCA considered the extent to 
which the environmental effects of the Potlatch expansion were 
subject to mitigation in determining whether the Potlatch project 
had the potential for significant environmental effects.  However, 
the court did not evaluate whether the environmental effects were 
subject to mitigation “by ongoing public regulatory authority,” as 
set forth in the EQB rules.  In determining whether a project has a 
potential for significant environmental effects, a governmental 
entity may consider “the extent to which the environmental effects 
are subject to mitigation by ongoing public regulatory
authority[.]”198  MPCA argued that it complied with the rules 
194. DNR Comment Letter (Respondent’s Appendix at A-1 to A-6, Potlatch, 569 
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
195. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 218.
196. DNR Comment Letter (Respondent’s Appendix at A-1 to A-6, Potlatch, 569 
N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391)).
197. See supra notes 169, 183 and accompanying texts.
198. MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C) (2001). See also supra note 31 and 
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because it considered such mitigation.  According to MPCA, SFRA 
required the DNR—a state agency with ongoing regulatory
authority—to monitor the level of compliance with and efficacy of 
the GEIS mitigation strategies.199  The environmental groups
responded that under SFRA, the timber harvesting and forest 
management guidelines are voluntary, and that voluntary
guidelines cannot constitute mitigation by ongoing public
regulatory authority.200  Although the parties briefed the issue in 
detail, the Potlatch opinion did not discuss the matter.  By
remaining silent, the court of appeals squandered an opportunity 
to offer meaningful guidance regarding the use of the GEIS and 
presaged a conflict that would resurface nearly five years later.201
A third flaw in the Potlatch opinion is a factual error.  In 
discussing the environmental review process for the Potlatch
expansion, the court stated that “[b]ecause the MPCA has no 
expertise in forestry and wildlife management, it delegated its 
responsibility for evaluating the impact of increased timber
harvesting to the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR).”202  This language appears virtually verbatim in the
environmental groups’ appellate brief.203  Use of the term
“delegation” to describe MPCA’s actions and DNR’s involvement is 
factually incorrect.  MPCA did not delegate responsibility for 
making an EIS decision to DNR.  Rather, as MPCA’s agenda item 
and issue statement presenting the EAW to the MPCA Citizen’s 
Board makes clear, “[D]uring the preparation of the EAW and the 
responses to comments, the MPCA staff sought the assistance from the 
DNR to review information submitted by Potlatch regarding timber 
issues and to prepare responses to comments on these issues.”204
accompanying text.  Note that the EQB rules only require an RGU to consider
whether environmental effects are subject to mitigation by ongoing regulatory 
authority in determining if a project has the potential for significant
environmental effects.  The rules do not require that measures be subject to 
“ongoing regulatory authority” to constitute “mitigation” under MEPA.
199. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
201. See infra Parts III. and IV.
202. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214.
203. See Appellants’ Brief at 4, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(No. C5-97-391) (“[t]he MPCA, although the RGU for the proposed expansion, 
has no expertise in forestry and wildlife management, and therefore delegated 
responsibility for evaluating the environmental effects of increased timber
harvesting to the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources.”).
204. MPCA Environmental Planning and Review Office, Potlatch Oriented 
Strand Board Plant Expansion Issue Statement, Nov. 28, 1995 at 3 (Appellants’ 
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MPCA staff “gratefully acknowledge[d]” the “invaluable assistance
from the DNR staff members involved in this effort.”205  Rather than 
characterizing MPCA’s decision to involve DNR as “delegation” to a 
more knowledgeable agency, the Potlatch court and the
environmental groups should have praised MPCA staff for seeking
DNR’s assistance.  In fact, the EQB regulations implementing 
MEPA specifically allow such an interdisciplinary approach in EIS 
preparation.206  Applying the same interdisciplinary principle to an 
EAW constitutes good government, not “delegation.”
The Potlatch case has also been the subject of some
unwarranted criticism.  One commentator recently criticized
Potlatch and Iron Rangers for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range 
Resources207 for the courts’ alleged unwillingness to conduct a
thorough review of administrative agency compliance with MEPA’s 
procedural requirements.208  According to the commentator,
Potlatch and Iron Rangers applied “the deferential arbitrary and 
capricious standard” rather than the standard of review under the 
Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”),209 resulting in 
the courts’ failure to “make the distinct inquiry of whether the 
agency followed proper procedure in making its determination.”210
To prevent future purported lapses, the commentator advocates 
that Minnesota courts conduct an invasive procedural and
substantive review of a governmental entity’s decision on the need 
for an EIS.211  The alleged justification for this novel standard of 
review arises from MEPA’s broad policy goals, which the
commentator suggests establish substantive standards.212
Appendix at A-238, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-
391)) (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. See MINN. R. 4410.2200 (1995) (stating that “[a]n EIS shall be prepared 
using an interdisciplinary approach[,]” that an RGU “may request that another 
governmental unit help in the completion of the EIS[,]” and that another
governmental unit “shall assist in the preparation of environmental documents on 
any project for which it has special expertise or access to information.”).
207. 531 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
208. Stacy Lynn Bettison, The Silencing of the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act: 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 967, 1006 (2000) [hereinafter Bettison].
209. MINN. STAT. § 14.69 (2001).
210. Bettison, supra note 208, at 971.
211. Id. at 995-1006.
212. See id. at 999-1000 (stating that “[t]he substantive elements of MEPA can 
be found principally in MEPA’s language directing state government to ‘use all
practicable means . . . to create and maintain conditions under which human 
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A “procedural and substantive” standard of review for negative 
EIS declarations is rooted in a fundamental misapprehension of 
MAPA and MEPA.  Contrary to the commentator’s assertions, there 
is no distinction between the “deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard” and the standard of review for agency actions under 
MAPA.  Indeed, MAPA expressly provides that Minnesota courts 
may reverse or modify an agency action if that action is “[m]ade 
upon unlawful procedure . . . [u]nsupported by substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted . . . or [a]rbitrary 
and capricious.”213  Advocating an “in-depth evaluation of the 
beings and nature can exist in productive harmony . . . ”) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 116D.02 (2001)).  Bettison errs in concluding that MEPA’s policy goals establish
a “substantive element.”  MEPA Section 116D.02 contains language nearly
identical to the policy goals of NEPA Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2002), which 
Bettison acknowledges does not establish enforceable standards of conduct and 
does not create a cause of action.  Bettison, supra note 208, at 969 n.8, and 999-
1000 n.181. Similarly, Minnesota courts have not transformed MEPA’s broad 
policy goals into substantive standards. See supra note 20.
213. MINN. STAT. § 14.69(c), (e)-(f) (2000).  As Bettison notes, the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), establishes a standard of 
judicial review that is “essentially identical” to MAPA.  Bettison, supra note 208, at 
978, n.51.  In reviewing agency decisions on the need for an EIS under NEPA, 
federal courts apply the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, not an
anomalous “procedural and substantive” review. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural 
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-78 (1989) (noting that the APA’s arbitrary and 
capricious standard is narrow, and that an agency must have the discretion to rely 
on the “reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts” even if a court might not 
make the same judgment); Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 
168, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Marsh and applying the arbitrary and capricious 
standard in upholding an agency’s decision under MEPA to forego preparation of 
an EIS after preparing an Environmental Assessment); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997) (if an agency has taken a “hard look” at 
the possible environmental effects of a proposed action, its decision on the need 
for an EIS is “a substantive question left to the informed discretion of the agency 
proposing the action” and is subject to review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 
1995) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing an agency’s EIS 
decision under MEPA to determine whether the agency “considered relevant 
factors or made a clear error of judgment”); Audubon Soc’y of Cent. Ark. v. 
Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 434 (8th Cir. 1992) (observing that an agency’s decision 
whether to conduct an EIS “involves mixed questions of fact and law,” and holding 
that federal courts “review[] agency treatment of such questions under the 
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard”); North Carolina v. Fed. Aviation 
Admin., 957 F.2d 1125, 1128 (4th Cir. 1992) (in applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard to an agency’s EIS decision, “a court must consider whether 
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment”); Sierra Club v. United States Dept. of 
Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (an agency has “broad discretion” in 
determining whether an EIS is necessary, “and the decision is reviewable only if it 
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agency’s actions [under MEPA]” by employing a standard of review 
that begins “as a procedural inquiry [and] ends as a substantive 
one”214 in order to “reestablish the ‘action-forcing’ nature of
MEPA”215 is simply a clarion call for judicial activism.  Minnesota 
courts are capable of ensuring strict adherence to MEPA’s
procedures without employing a standard of review that invites the 
court to substitute its judgment for that of the RGU.  If an RGU 
genuinely fails to comply with MEPA’s procedures,216 then its 
was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion”). See also Daniel R. Mandelker, 
NEPA LAW & LITIGATION §§ 8.6-8.7 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing arbitrary and
capricious standard of review under NEPA).  Federal courts, therefore, defer to 
“the informed discretion of responsible federal agencies” in examining
environmental review issues within an agency’s “technical expertise.” Marsh, 490 
U.S. at 377 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).  A court 
may not “substitute its own judgment for that of the agency,” Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 
410 n. 21, or reject on substantive grounds an agency’s decision to proceed with a 
project after environmental review is complete.  Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood 
Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam). See also Hoffman, 132 
F.3d at 14 (stating that “the ultimate scope of judicial review” of an agency’s 
decision on the need for an EIS is “narrow,” and that “[t]he judiciary must not 
interject itself into an area where the choice of action to be taken is one confided 
by Congress to the executive branch”); North Carolina v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
957 F.2d at 1128 (observing that “the ultimate standard of review [of an agency’s 
EIS decision] is a narrow one,” and that “the court is not empowered to substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency”).
214. Bettison, supra note 208, at 1000-01.
215. Id. at 996.  MEPA is not “action-forcing” and does not analyze the 
substantive merits of a proposed project.  Rather, environmental review under 
MEPA is an information-gathering procedure designed to evaluate the
environmental consequences of a proposal that requires “major governmental 
action.” See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also Coon Creek Watershed 
Dist. v. State Envtl. Quality Bd., 315 N.W.2d 604, 605 (Minn. 1982) (noting that an 
EIS is an informational document that examines environmental consequences, 
explores alternatives, and discusses mitigation measures); Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 
218 (“[e]nvironmental review is a process of information gathering and analysis”).
216. Bettison asserts that MPCA in Potlatch “failed to comply with the
procedures [of MEPA] on their face.”  Bettison, supra note 208 at 1005.  In 
actuality, MPCA acted appropriately in relying upon the official opinion of DNR, 
the agency with expertise in forestry and wildlife management. See supra note 185 
and accompanying text.  DNR determined that a project-specific EIS for the 
Potlatch expansion would duplicate the GEIS by employing the same information 
database and the same modeling assumptions to assess the effects of timber 
harvesting. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.  Note also that in 
Potlatch, the parties agreed that the court of appeals should determine whether 
MPCA’s decision not to conduct an EIS was arbitrary and capricious, or was 
unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. Appellants’ 
Brief at 14-15, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. C5-97-391);
Respondent MPCA’s Brief at 10-12, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997) (No. C5-97-391).
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actions are arbitrary and capricious under MAPA and will be set 
aside.217
B. The EQB Considers the Status of the Timber Harvesting GEIS
As the parties were litigating the Potlatch case, Boise Cascade 
Corporation approached MPCA with a proposal to expand its Kraft 
pulp and paper mill in International Falls, Minnesota.218  Boise 
Cascade wanted to expand the facility to increase wood
consumption by 100,000 cords annually, to a total of 700,000 cords 
per year.219  As with the Potlatch expansion, the EQB rules required 
an EAW for the Boise Cascade project as a result of increased air 
emissions.220  MPCA, the governmental entity that the EQB rules 
designate as the RGU for projects increasing air emissions by more 
than 100 tons per year, again turned to DNR for assistance in 
evaluating the environmental effects of increased timber harvesting 
217. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Minn. Dept. of Agric., 528 N.W.2d 903, 909 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the Department of Agriculture’s decision not 
to perform an EIS was arbitrary and capricious, where the Department of
Agriculture ignored DNR’s, MPCA’s, and the Department of Health’s
recommendations to conduct an EIS, failed to analyze potential environmental 
effects, and assumed that monitoring or permitting would eliminate any
significant effects). Trout Unlimited considered whether the Department of 
Agriculture’s decision on the need for an EIS complied with MEPA’s procedural 
dictates, was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, and 
was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at  907-09.  In Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464-65,
the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that determining the need for an EIS 
under MEPA “is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the 
agency’s technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented,” and that 
Minnesota courts should “review the decision not to prepare an EIS for whether it 
was unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted 
or was arbitrary and capricious.” See infra Part IV.B.
218. Boise Cascade began the information gathering process for an EAW 
regarding the expansion of its International Falls mill in September 1995.
Intervenor-Respondent Boise Cascade’s Brief at 4, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 
(Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96).
219. MPCA, Environmental Assessment Worksheet for Boise Cascade Pulp Mill 
Efficiency Improvement and Boiler No. 2 Projects, International Falls, Minnesota,
at 20 (Feb. 17, 1999) (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-58,
Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) [hereinafter Boise 
EAW].
220. See Boise EAW, supra note 219, at 1 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court 
Appendix at R-39) Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96))
(noting that MPCA must prepare an EAW for the project under MINN. R.
4410.4300, subp. 15A, because the project was predicted to increase generation of 
a regulated air pollutant emitted by the expanded facility by 100 tons or more per 
year). See also supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the Potlatch 
expansion).
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associated with the Boise Cascade expansion.221  DNR concluded 
that the increased harvest “is of the type and extent envisioned in 
the GEIS analysis,” and that it was “reasonable to infer that the 
environmental consequences of this project, in terms of timber 
harvest, do not differ substantially from the conclusions reached in 
the GEIS.”222  Significantly, however, DNR stated that the GEIS did 
not evaluate “landscape-level habitat fragmentation effects,”223 and 
that “further research is necessary to identify how timber harvest 
and forest fragmentation cumulatively effects the landscape-scale
distribution of habitat types over time.”224  MPCA, with DNR’s 
assistance, ultimately completed a 165-page EAW in February 1999 
and circulated the document for public comment.225
During the public comment period, MPCA received twenty-two
comment letters.226  The most significant was a letter from the 
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (“MCEA”), which 
stated that the EAW had a “fundamental flaw.”227  MCEA noted that 
the EQB rules allow “project-specific environmental review” to use 
the information in a generic EIS “if the EQB determines that the 
generic EIS remains adequate at the time the specific project is 
subject to review.”228  The environmental review rules, MCEA 
correctly observed, require the EQB to determine that a generic
EIS is adequate for use in project-specific environmental review.
221. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B, BCC International Falls Kraft 
Pulp & Paper Mill Improvement Project, DNR Project Evaluation (Respondent 
MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-124 to R-137, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 
457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
222. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B, at 14 (Respondent MCEA’s 
Supreme Court Appendix at R-137, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) 
(No. C6-01-96)).
223. Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing “landscape-
level” and “site-level” effects).
224. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B, at 14 (Respondent MCEA’s 
Supreme Court Appendix at R-137, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) 
(No. C6-01-96)).
225. MPCA North District Operations and Planning Section, Issue Statement, 
Boise Cascade Efficiency Improvement Project, Feb. 22, 2000 at 2 (Respondent 
MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-196, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
226. Id.
227. Letter from James L. Erkel, Attorney and Forest Project Director,
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (“MCEA”), to Craig Affeldt,
Project Manager, MPCA 1 (Apr. 7, 1999) (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court 
Appendix at R-188, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
228. Id. at 2 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-189, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)), citing MINN. R. 4410.3800, 
subp. 8 (1999).
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MPCA and DNR could not rely on the GEIS in evaluating the Boise 
Cascade project, MCEA maintained, because “[t]he EAW contains 
no indication that EQB reached a determination that the [now five 
year old] GEIS remains adequate for use in regard to assessing the 
potential for significant environmental effects of the production 
expansion at Boise Cascade’s mill.”229
MCEA’s comment precipitated an MPCA inquiry to the EQB 
regarding the ability to rely upon the GEIS in reviewing the Boise 
Cascade project.230  The EQB responded that the environmental 
review rules prohibited MPCA’s reliance on the GEIS until the EQB 
determined that the study remained adequate. 231  As a result, the 
EQB would make an adequacy determination by following its 
normal procedures—it would accept written and oral comments at 
regularly scheduled EQB meetings.232  In making the
determination, the EQB would evaluate whether there was
“substantial new information or new circumstances” since
completion of the GEIS in April 1994 that “may significantly affect 
the potential environmental effects or the availability of prudent 
and feasible alternatives with lesser environmental effects.”233
The EQB accepted written comments regarding the continued
adequacy of the GEIS and conducted a public meeting at which it 
received oral comments.234  Persons challenging the continued 
adequacy of the GEIS raised three issues.  First, they criticized the 
analytical model that the GEIS used to simulate timber harvests, 
arguing that it overestimated tree growth and underestimated 
environmental effects.235  Second, they maintained that the GEIS 
employed assumptions regarding forest management and
mitigation that in practice had not been implemented.236  Third, 
229. Id.
230. EQB Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re
Determination Whether the Timber Harvesting GIES Remains Adequate, Dec. 20, 
1999, at 2 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-303, Boise Cascade,
644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) [hereinafter EQB GEIS Findings].
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2-3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-303 to 
R-304, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) (citing MINN.
R. 4410.3000, subp. 3.A (1999)).
234. EQB GEIS Findings, supra note 230, at 3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme 
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they asserted that in 1995 the GEIS did not consider landscape-
level effects,237 even though such an analysis was possible as a result 
of new timber harvest models.238
Persons supporting the continued adequacy of the GEIS noted 
that criticisms of the GEIS models did not constitute “substantial 
new information;” the critique simply repeated earlier arguments 
made prior to the EQB’s finding that the GEIS was adequate in 
April 1994.239  The GEIS supporters also disputed that too few 
mitigation measures were in place, asserting that the industry made 
“extensive” changes in timber harvesting techniques and
equipment since 1994.240  Regarding landscape-level effects, they 
opined that the GEIS included landscape-level analysis and
geographical information even though it did not use the latest 
models.241
After weighing the arguments, the EQB in December 1999 
concluded that the GEIS was “no longer as accurate as it was when 
it was completed,” but was “still accurate enough if used,
interpreted, and qualified properly in project-specific
environmental review to adequately inform decision makers.”242
The EQB declared that objections regarding the GEIS tree growth 
model did not constitute substantial new information, because 
EQB considered and dismissed the same argument in determining 
that the GEIS was adequate in 1994.243  In addition, the EQB found 
that the existence of new timber harvesting models did not
constitute substantial new information, because there was no new 
data to include in the models.244  With respect to mitigation, the 
237. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing “landscape-level
habitat fragmentation effects”).
238. EQB GEIS Findings, supra note 230, at 3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme 
Court Appendix at R-304, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-
96)).
239. Id. at 4 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-305, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
240. Id. at 3 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-304, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
241. Id. at 4 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-304, Boise 
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
242. Id. at 5 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-306, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
243. Id. at 4 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-305, Boise 
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
244. Id.  The EQB found that the GEIS used the 1990 FIA forest inventory 
database, and that the FIA database had not been updated since 1990.  DNR and 
the United States Forest Service began updating the FIA database in 1999, and 
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EQB determined that the GEIS evaluated the consequences of 
failing to implement mitigation; MPCA and DNR adjust that
information as appropriate in project-specific environmental
review.245  Finally, EQB stated that new models capable of mapping 
the simulated results of timber harvesting on a landscape level did 
not render the GEIS inadequate, because RGUs could employ such 
models when needed on a case-by-case basis.246
Shortly after the EQB determined that the GEIS remained 
adequate, DNR recommended against an EIS for the Boise Cascade 
project.  According to DNR, the “potential effects of the project 
itself to natural resources are minor, especially when considering 
the scale of proposed increase, dispersed nature of related activity, 
and the factors that govern timber markets in this state.”247  In 
arriving at its conclusion, DNR relied upon the GEIS and the 
“ongoing implementation of programmatic mitigations authorized 
under the Sustainable Forest Resources Act (SFRA).”248  DNR also 
prepared a sixty-six page response to the EAW comments that 
MPCA received on timber harvesting issues, which MPCA attached 
to the Boise Cascade EAW.249  Relying upon DNR’s
recommendation, MPCA issued a negative declaration on the need 
would complete the update for the entire state in 2003.  According to EQB, 
“[u]ntil the new FIA data are available, any forestry modeling similar to what was 
done in the GEIS will be based on the 1990 data.” Id.  Although EQB could use 
the 1990 FIA in the newer models and obtain results “likely [to] be more accurate 
than those contained in the GEIS,” EQB found that such results “would be inferior 
to those obtained by waiting until the new FIA data are available.” Id.  In addition, 
EQB found that “[i]f the GEIS analysis were done today with new models, it would
need to be updated again in 2003 because the new FIA inventory will constitute 
substantial new information.” Id. (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix 
at R-305, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
245. Id. at 4-5 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-305 to 
R-306, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
246. Id. at 5 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-306, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
247. Letter from Thomas W. Balcom, Supervisor, Environmental Review and 
Assistance Unit, DNR, to Beth Lockwood, Supervisor, North District Operations 
and Planning, MPCA 2, Jan. 24, 2000 (Supreme Court Appendix of Appellants 
MPCA and Boise Cascade Corp. at A73, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
248. Id.
249. DNR, Comments and Responses on Timber Harvest Issues, Proposed 
Boise Cascade Corporation International Falls Mill Efficiency Improvement
Project EAW, Jan. 24, 2000 (Supreme Court Appendix of Appellants MPCA and 
Boise Cascade Corp. at A75-A143, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) 
(No. C6-01-96)).
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for a project-specific EIS.250
C. The Boise Cascade District Court Opinion
On March 22, 2000, MCEA filed a complaint against MPCA in 
Koochiching County District Court.  The complaint alleged that 
MPCA’s decision not to prepare an EIS for the Boise Cascade 
project violated MEPA.251  Boise Cascade Corporation intervened,
and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.252
In support of its summary judgment motions and in
opposition to MCEA’s, MPCA advanced many of the same
arguments that it relied upon in Potlatch.  MPCA urged the district 
court to “carefully review” the Potlatch decision, “because the facts 
and issues concerned timber harvesting effects that closely parallel 
those pending in th[e] [Boise Cascade] case.”253  During the course 
of environmental review, MPCA argued, it appropriately
considered the four criteria in the EQB rules for determining the 
“potential for significant environmental effects.”  MPCA also
maintained that it considered the type and extent of the Boise 
proposal’s effects, and relied upon DNR’s conclusion that the 
potential effects of the project were minor in the area where Boise 
Cascade would secure additional timber.254  Relying upon the 
extensive discussion of cumulative timber harvesting effects in the 
GEIS was appropriate, MPCA claimed, precisely because project-
specific review of such effects was impossible.255  MPCA also argued 
that other environmental studies conducted under SFRA would 
“anticipate and control” the environmental effects of timber
harvesting.256  Finally, and most significantly, MPCA asserted that 
the cumulative effects of timber harvesting were subject to
mitigation established by SFRA.257  To implement the GEIS
250. MPCA Findings of Fact and Conclusions, In re Decision on the Need for 
an EIS for the Proposed Boise Cascade Pulp and Paper Mill Efficiency
Improvement Project, Feb. 22, 2000 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court
Appendix at R-201 to R-213, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-
01-96)) [hereinafter MPCA Boise Cascade EAW Findings].
251. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 462.
252. Id.
253. MPCA’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 27, Boise
Cascade (No. 36-C3-00-000173).
254. Id. at 34-35.
255. Id. at 29-33.
256. Id. at 38-42.
257. Id. at 35-38.
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mitigation measures, the legislature enacted SFRA and created the 
Forest Resources Council.  The EAW identified the mitigation 
measures set forth in the GEIS and adopted by the Council, as well 
as the implementation status of timber harvesting mitigation.
MPCA concluded that there was “substantial evidence in the
record . . . that the Council, the DNR, and others are carrying out 
legislative mandates to implement the mitigation measures.”258
Echoing its arguments in Potlatch, MCEA responded that the 
GEIS had a “statewide and generic focus” that was inappropriate 
for analyzing the project-specific effects of the Boise Cascade 
expansion.259  MCEA also argued that the GEIS model assumptions 
did not accurately reflect forest management policies and practices 
in place when MPCA reviewed the Boise Cascade project.260  The 
Potlatch case was distinguishable, according to MCEA, because the 
mitigation measures relied upon by the court of appeals “have not 
been fully implemented in the field.”261  MCEA asserted that 
MPCA’s reliance upon SFRA was inappropriate because the statute 
did not “supersede MEPA,” and because the Minnesota Forest 
Resources Council did not provide “ongoing regulatory authority” 
sufficient to mitigate the environmental effects of increased timber 
harvesting associated with the Boise Cascade project.262  According 
to MCEA, the Council made policy only, and had no rulemaking, 
permitting, or enforcement authority.  As a result, MCEA
concluded that there was no reason to assume the Council’s
guidelines would reflect the GEIS mitigation measures, and no 
mechanism to determine the extent of the guidelines’
implementation.263
The district court granted MPCA’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that MPCA considered the four factors set forth 
in EQB’s rules in determining that the Boise Cascade proposal did 
not have a potential for significant environmental effects.264  The 
court found that the EAW considered the potential type, extent,
and reversibility of any environmental effects of timber harvesting 
258. Id. at 38.
259. MCEA’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Boise
Cascade (No. 36-C3-00-000173).
260. Id. at 22-25.
261. Id. at 25.
262. Id. at 26-27.
263. Id. at 27.
264. Boise Cascade, File No. 36-C3-00-000173 (Koochiching County Dist. Ct. 
Nov. 15, 2000).
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likely to result from the Boise Cascade project.  “MPCA analyzed an 
enormous array of potential environmental impacts” relating to the 
project, according to the court, and “devoted enormous attention 
to the single issue—timber harvesting—contested by MCEA.”265  In 
addition, the court held that MPCA considered the cumulative 
potential effects of related or anticipated future projects, and “used 
the information in the GEIS exactly as it is required to be used 
under applicable rules.”266  MCEA’s objections to MPCA’s use of the 
GEIS, the court opined, were identical to the comments MCEA 
submitted to the EQB on the continued adequacy of the GEIS.
The EQB considered the criticisms but determined that the GEIS 
remained adequate for MPCA’s use in evaluating the Boise Cascade 
project.  Because MCEA failed to appeal the EQB’s determination, 
the court found the critique of the GEIS untimely.267  Even 
assuming MCEA’s attack on the GEIS was timely, the court held 
that the arguments did not establish that MPCA failed to consider 
the Boise Cascade project’s cumulative potential effects.268
Regarding “mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority,” 
the court first noted that proposed mitigation measures must be 
“more than mere vague statements of good intentions.”269  Under 
Minnesota law, MPCA could base its determination that the Boise 
Cascade project did not have the potential for significant
environmental effect on mitigation measures that kept the effects 
below a significance level.270  The court found that it was not 
arbitrary and capricious for MPCA to rely upon progress in
implementing mitigation under SFRA to address any potential 
cumulative effects of timber harvesting identified in the GEIS.271
Recognizing that the mitigation guidelines implemented under 
SFRA are voluntary, the court nonetheless held that SFRA
constituted “an ongoing pubic regulatory authority” because “the 
Legislature intended the [Minnesota Forest Resources Council] to 
be the means by which to accomplish the mitigation recommended 
in the GEIS.”272  SFRA ensures that “DNR, an agency with ongoing 
regulatory authority will indeed monitor both the level of
265. Id. at 9.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 11 (citing Iron Rangers, 531 N.W.2d at 881).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 11-12.
272. Id. at 13.
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compliance and the effectiveness of mitigation strategies.”273  The 
court concluded that MCPA acted reasonably, that the decision 
against an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious, and that substantial 
evidence in the administrative record supported MPCA’s judgment 
on the Boise Cascade project.
IV. THE TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS INEXPLICABLY IGNORED—BOISE
CASCADE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. Arguments of the Parties
MCEA appealed the district court’s decision in Boise Cascade,
seeking reversal on three broad grounds: (1) that MPCA
improperly relied upon the GEIS; (2) that the timber harvesting 
effects of the Boise project would not be addressed through 
“ongoing public regulatory authority”; and (3) that the
recommended GEIS mitigation measures had not been adopted.274
In particular, MCEA alleged that the Forest Resources Council’s 
site-level timber management guidelines differed from the
mitigation measures assumed in the GEIS.275  In addition, MCEA 
contended that SFRA’s programs did not constitute “ongoing 
public regulatory authority” sufficient to obviate the need for a 
project-specific EIS on timber harvesting.276  Finally, MCEA
maintained that the district court erred in failing to identify the 
specific mitigation measures in place and the efficacy of those 
measures in addressing the potential environmental effects of the 
Boise project.277
MPCA countered that DNR, upon whose expertise MPCA 
relied in determining that an EIS for the Boise project was
unnecessary, considered the specific effects of the project in the 
context of other ongoing timber harvesting.278  Regarding
mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority, MPCA argued 
273. Id. at 14.
274. Appellant MCEA’s Statement of the Case at 6-7, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 
230 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
275. MCEA’s Brief at 21-26, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
276. Id. at 35-41.
277. Id. at 30-35.
278. MPCA’s Brief at 19-29, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
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that DNR, Boise Cascade Corporation, and other public and
private forest owners were carrying out the Forest Resources
Council’s management guidelines, and that SFRA required DNR 
and the Council to monitor implementation of the guidelines.279
Accordingly, MPCA maintained that it was reasonable for the
agency to rely upon the guidelines to mitigate the effects of timber 
harvesting associated with the Boise project.  MPCA also contended 
that Appendix E to the Boise EAW established that federal, state,
and local governments would apply the Forest Resources Council’s 
guidelines to the majority of land that would provide timber for the 
Boise project.280
B. The Boise Cascade Court of Appeals Opinion
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that 
the record did not “adequately support” MPCA’s decision that “the 
environmental impact of the Boise modification will not be such as 
to require an EIS.”281  After declaring that the proper standard of 
review was whether MPCA’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or capricious,282 the court noted that an EAW is a document 
designed to determine whether a project requires an EIS.283  The 
court then recited the four factors that MPCA must consider in 
determining whether the Boise project had the potential for
significant environmental effects such that an EIS was necessary.284
Upon considering the four factors, MPCA must support its decision 
on the need for an EIS with substantial evidence in the
administrative record.  “Substantial evidence,” the court explained,
is “relevant evidence considered in its entirety that is more than 
some evidence or a scintilla of evidence,”285 and is of a quality such 
that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”286
Embarking on its substantive analysis, the court focused on 
279. Id. at 29-36.
280. Id. at 30-32.
281. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230, 232-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 644 
N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002).
282. Id. at 234-35.
283. Id. at 235, quoting MINN. R. 4410.0200, subp. 24 (1999).
284. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235, quoting MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7 
(1999).
285. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235.
286. Id. (quoting White v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 457 N.W.2d 724, 730 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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MCEA’s argument that the recommended GEIS mitigation
measures had not been adopted.  Quoting the familiar standard 
that “mitigation measures must be more than ‘vague statements of 
good intentions,’”287 the court observed that “mitigation is an 
important criterion to consider when determining the potential for 
significant environmental impacts.”288  As a result, environmental 
review documents must discuss mitigation “in sufficient detail to 
ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly
evaluated.”289  The GEIS identified many mitigation strategies to 
address the environmental effects of timber harvesting, and the 
court found that the state was implementing the measures “to some 
extent.”290  However, the court stated that its review of the record 
revealed most of the measures were still in the planning stages, and 
the Boise EAW recognized that “[r]esearch beyond the scope of 
this EAW” was required to address the certain cumulative timber 
harvesting effects and to “apply the results [of such research] in 
developing appropriate mitigation strategies.”291  The court opined, 
therefore, that the efficacy of the mitigation measures for the Boise 
Cascade project was “questionable” because:
A great number of the measures remain inchoate and 
subject only to future monitoring; there are inaccuracies 
in and omissions from the GEIS that require further
research and investigation; some of the conclusions in the 
GEIS about mitigation are outdated; and none of the 
mitigation measures is assured because none is mandated 
to occur.292
As in Trout Unlimited, where the Minnesota Department of
Agriculture, in deciding that an EIS was unnecessary, simply
assumed that monitoring or permitting would eliminate any
significant environmental effects,293 the court found “substantially
lacking” any assurances “that reasonable mitigation measures will 
287. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting Iron Rangers for Responsible 
Ridge Action v. Iron Range Res., 531 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).
288. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 235, citing MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) 
(1999).
289. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 236, quoting Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain 
v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
290. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 236.
291. Id. (quoting Boise EAW, supra note 219).
292. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
293. 528 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). See supra note 217.
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be in place before the harm is done.”294
With respect to whether MPCA considered mitigation
measures “by ongoing public regulatory authority,”295 the court 
stated that the Minnesota legislature enacted SFRA “ostensibly to 
facilitate the implementation of the GEIS mitigation strategies.”296
However, the court noted that the Minnesota Forest Resources 
Council—the entity that SFRA created to implement the GEIS—
“does not truly perform a regulatory function” because compliance 
with the guidelines is voluntary.297  Without assurances that
“mitigation measures can be compelled,” the court concluded that 
the potential for significant environmental effects would remain.298
Finally, the court distinguished Potlatch,299 rejecting MPCA’s 
argument that the case was the “mirror image”300 of Boise Cascade.
“Because we do not have before us the administrative record from 
[Potlatch],” the court opined, “we cannot tell whether or not the 
two cases are factually mirror images of each other.”301
Nevertheless, the court found that unlike Potlatch, where the court 
of appeals observed that the EAW targeted specific mitigation 
measures “that have been or will soon be implemented,”302 the Boise
Cascade administrative record established that important mitigation 
measures were not “beyond the guidelines or strategizing stage.”303
In addition, it appeared to the court that “monitoring of the 
compliance with and effectiveness of mitigation measures is
substantially lacking.”304
C. Evaluating the Court of Appeals Opinion
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals in Boise
Cascade committed four serious errors.  The court improperly 
substituted its own judgment for that of the Minnesota legislature, 
wrongly substituted its judgment for that of MPCA, failed to offer a 
294. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237-38.
295. MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999).
296. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
300. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
303. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
304. Id.
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principled distinction of Potlatch, and erred in assuming that
measures must be required by regulation to constitute mitigation 
under MEPA.  Each of these omissions is discussed in detail below.
Perhaps the court’s gravest oversight was in substituting its 
judgment for that of the legislature.  According to the court, 
although the legislature “ostensibly” enacted SFRA to implement 
the GEIS mitigation strategies, the “voluntary” nature of the Forest 
Resources Council’s guidelines imbued the measures with an
“evanescent quality” such that the court doubted mitigation would 
be in place “before the harm is done.”305  In essence, the court of 
appeals held that SFRA could not comply with the EQB rules 
requiring MPCA to consider “mitigation by ongoing public
regulatory authority”306 because the Council’s guidelines were
voluntary.
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals misconstrued 
the EQB rules and utterly disregarded SFRA.  As a result, the court 
violated the doctrine that statutes embracing the same subject 
matter should be construed to “harmonize with each other and 
give full effect to all so far as this may reasonably be done.”307  In 
addition, a court may not act as “a superlegislature to weigh the 
wisdom of legislation”308 or evaluate the public policy merits of a 
regulatory program to implement timber harvesting practices as 
opposed to voluntary measures.309  By criticizing the “voluntary” 
nature of timber harvesting guidelines under SFRA and finding 
that such guidelines could not constitute appropriate mitigation 
under MEPA, the court of appeals exceeded the limited mandate 
of judicial review and engaged in policy-making.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, the legislature’s 
305. Id. at 237-38.
306. Id. at 235 (citing MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999)).
307. Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 247 Minn. 413, 418, 77 
N.W.2d 425, 428 (1956), quoting Comm’r of Highways v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 176 
Minn. 501, 507, 223 N.W. 915, 917 (1929). See also No Power Line, 262 N.W.2d at 
323 n.30 (construing MEPA and the Power Plant Siting Act, and declaring that the 
“general rule is that statutes covering the same subject matter should be construed
consistently”); State ex rel. Carlton v. Weed, 208 Minn. 342, 344, 294 N.W.2d 370, 
372 (Minn. 1940) (“all statutes that relate to the same subject matter were 
presumably enacted in accord with the same general legislative policy, and . . .
together they constitute an harmonious and uniform system of law.”); MINN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (2000) (providing that the “object of all interpretation and construction 
of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,” therefore 
“[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions”).
308. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
309. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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enactment of SFRA was not “ostensibly” to implement the GEIS.
Rather, the legislature enacted SFRA precisely because the GEIS 
suggested such a policy approach.310  The GEIS recommended that 
the state establish a forest resources board to implement timber 
harvest and forest management mitigation measures.311  The
legislature responded by creating the Minnesota Forest Resources 
Council under SFRA.312  Similarly, the GEIS recommended a forest 
resources practices program to develop site-level timber harvest 
and forest management practices,313 so the legislature required the 
Council to develop such guidelines.314  Because the GEIS rejected a 
“command and control” regulatory program as overly costly and 
unnecessary,315 the legislature decreed that forest practice
guidelines under SFRA would be voluntary.316 The GEIS also 
suggested that monitoring was necessary to determine compliance 
with and efficacy of measures to mitigate the environmental effects 
of timber harvesting, and that additional research was needed to fill 
certain information gaps regarding Minnesota’s forests.317
Accordingly, the legislature included extensive monitoring
programs in SFRA,318 and established a research advisory committee 
to assess the “strategic directions in forest resources research.”319  By 
310. GEIS, supra note 10, at xxxii-xxxiii.
311. Id.
312. MINN. STAT. §§ 89A.03, 89A.05-.06 (2000).
313. GEIS, supra note 10, at xxix-xxx.
314. MINN. STAT. § 89A.05 (2000).
315. See GEIS, supra note 10, at Appendix 4, 4-1 to 4-3  (“to help avoid costly 
public and private steps,” the site-level forest management practices program 
“should initially be voluntary”) and Appendix 4, 4-4 to 4-6 (“compliance [with 
forest practices programs] is only slightly better where the regulatory practices are 
mandatory and there is a thorough companion monitoring and compliance
enforcement program . . . and any regulatory program of this type can be costly to 
both public agencies and private concerns.”).  For example, California has what
the GEIS termed “a complex mandatory program.” Id. at Appendix 4, 4-5. See
generally Thomas N. Lippe & Kathy Bailey, Regulation of Logging on Private Land in 
California Under Governor Gray Davis, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351 (2001) 
(discussing California’s program regulating logging on private and state-owned
lands). The GEIS found that in 1991, administrative and enforcement
expenditures for California’s program exceeded $10 million annually.  GEIS, supra
note 10, at Appendix 4, 4-6.
316. MINN. STAT. § 89A.05.
317. GEIS, supra note 10, at xxx-xxxi.
318. MINN. STAT. § 89A.07 (2000) (requiring DNR monitoring of broad forest 
trends, compliance with the Council’s guidelines, and the effectiveness of the 
Council’s guidelines and other efforts in addressing the environmental effects of 
timber harvesting).
319. MINN. STAT. § 89A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
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emphasizing the EIS significance criterion related to the mitigation 
of environmental effects by ongoing regulatory authority, the court 
of appeals simply cast aside SFRA, the statute carefully designed to 
implement the GEIS recommendations in the manner that the 
GEIS suggested.
The court of appeals’ second major oversight involved
substituting its judgment for that of MPCA.  According to the 
court, the administrative record demonstrated that some mitigation 
measures “have [not] gotten beyond the guidelines or strategizing 
stage,” and that mitigation effectiveness monitoring was
“substantially lacking.”320 Under SFRA, however, site-level
mitigation measures will never get beyond the “guidelines stage,” 
because the Forest Resources Council’s guidelines are voluntary by 
design.  Even if MPCA prepared a site-specific EIS for the Boise 
Cascade project, the voluntary nature of the timber harvesting 
guidelines would remain unchanged. The court of appeals’
complaint that the measures will never be more than guidelines 
rejects the legislature’s policy in enacting SFRA.  Moreover, the 
court of appeals’ conclusion that mitigation measures would not be 
in place simply ignores the administrative record.  The Boise EAW 
includes a nearly forty-page appendix describing the
implementation status of mitigation measures promulgated by the 
Forest Resources Council, DNR, and other public agencies.321  The 
EAW also lists the mitigation measures that Boise Cascade
Corporation implemented to address the cumulative effects of 
timber harvesting, including programs to ensure that the loggers 
selling wood to Boise Cascade comply with the Forest Resources 
Council’s voluntary guidelines and best management practices.322
With respect to monitoring, DNR noted that the Council 
approved a guideline implementation monitoring process and that 
DNR was collecting field data on the effectiveness of the
guidelines.323  DNR stated that it “is committed to meeting its 
320. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
321. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix E (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-142 - R181, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)).
322. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix F (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme 
Court Appendix at R-182 to R-184, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)).
323. DNR, Comments and Responses on Timber Harvest Issues, Proposed 
Boise Cascade Corporation International Falls Mill Efficiency Improvement
Project EAW, Jan. 24, 2000 (Supreme Court Appendix of Appellants MPCA and 
Boise Cascade Corp. at A82-A83, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. Ct. App. 
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responsibilities, in conjunction with the broader [Forest Resources 
Council], in providing the Legislature with the information
required under SFRA.”324  Accordingly, substantial evidence in the 
administrative record supported MPCA’s conclusion that the
mitigation measures promulgated under SFRA were being
implemented as the GEIS and the legislature intended.  By
articulating concerns regarding the implementation of timber 
harvesting mitigation in light of the evidence in the record, the 
court of appeals simply substituted its judgment for that of MPCA 
rather than determining whether MPCA acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner.
In holding that voluntary measures do not constitute
mitigation under MEPA, the court of appeals committed a third 
major error.  There is no requirement under MEPA that mitigation 
measures be mandatory or subject to regulatory enforcement.  On 
the contrary, such measures need not be a permit condition or 
even a contractual obligation for an agency to rely upon them in 
determining whether a project has a significant environmental 
effect.325  As the United States Supreme Court has held, NEPA 
simply requires that environmental review documents discuss
mitigation in “sufficient detail to ensure that environmental
consequences have been fairly evaluated,” but does not impose “a 
substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually 
formulated and adopted.”326  Similarly, the EQB rules require an 
agency to consider the extent to which environmental effects are 
subject to mitigation by ongoing regulatory authority327—they do 
not establish that a regulatory program is a prerequisite to MEPA 
mitigation.
The court of appeals’ reliance upon Trout Unlimited is equally 
inapposite.328 In Trout Unlimited, the Minnesota Department of 
Agriculture decided not to require an EIS for a project under 
MEPA after ignoring the recommendations of three other state 
agencies that an EIS was necessary.329  In addition, the Department 
of Agriculture failed to analyze any of the project’s potential 
environmental effects, and merely assumed that future monitoring 
2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)).
324. Id. at A83.
325. Audubon Soc’y of Cent. Ark. v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1992).
326. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989).
327. MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999).
328. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 236-38.
329. Trout Unlimited, 528 N.W.2d at 907-09. See also supra note 217.
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or permitting would eliminate any significant effects.330  MPCA, in 
contrast, evaluated the status of current and ongoing mitigation 
efforts in determining that an EIS was unnecessary for the Boise 
Cascade project, and relied upon DNR’s conclusion that the
project did not have a potential for significant environmental 
effects.  As a result, the court’s concern that MPCA’s actions were 
in any way similar to those of the Department of Agriculture in 
Trout Unlimited was unfounded.
Finally, in failing to offer a principled distinction of Potlatch,
the court of appeals committed a fourth mistake. According to the 
court, it could not determine whether the Potlatch case was a 
“mirror image” of the Boise Cascade litigation because the court did 
not have access to the Potlatch administrative record.331  The court, 
however, had access to the Potlatch opinion, as well as the
administrative record for MPCA’s decision regarding the Boise 
Cascade project.  In Potlatch, the court of appeals held that MPCA 
properly relied upon the information in the GEIS in preparing an 
EAW for a wood products facility expansion, and that “the EAW 
and the GEIS provide and target specific mitigation measures to 
reduce the impact of any adverse effects.”332  The GEIS that the 
Potlatch court found targeted “specific mitigation measures” was the 
same GEIS that MPCA relied upon in the Boise Cascade case.  MPCA 
determined just over one year after the GEIS was completed that 
the Potlatch expansion did not require an EIS;333 the EQB found 
that the GEIS remained adequate just a few months before MPCA 
made its EIS decision on the Boise Cascade project.334  Like the 
330. Id.
331. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.
332. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 217.
333. The EQB found the GEIS was adequate in April 1994. See generally GEIS, 
supra note 10.  MPCA issued its negative decision on the need for an EIS for the 
Potlatch project in November 1995. Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 214.
334. See supra Part III.B.  The court of appeals’ declaration that “there are 
inaccuracies in and omissions from the GEIS that require further research and 
investigation” is particularly troubling. Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d at 237.  MCEA 
submitted extensive comments as EQB evaluated whether the GEIS remained 
adequate for use in evaluating the Boise project, see supra Part III.B., but did not 
challenge the EQB’s decision that the GEIS remained accurate enough for
MPCA’s use.  As a result, the adequacy of the GEIS was not before the court.  In 
addition, Appendix G to the Boise EAW, supra note 219 (Respondent MCEA’s 
Supreme Court Appendix at R-185 to R-187, Boise Cascade, 632 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2001) (No. C6-01-96), rev’d, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002)), specifically
identifies the statistical uncertainties present in assessing the effects of timber 
harvesting, and explains how those uncertainties affect the environmental analysis.
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Potlatch EAW, the Boise Cascade EAW discussed specific
environmental effects likely to result from the project and
measures to mitigate those effects.335  In fact, MPCA’s
administrative record for the Boise Cascade project documented 
that implementation of the GEIS mitigation measures—which the 
Potlatch court found adequate in 1997—had progressed
substantially since the court of appeals decided Potlatch.336
Distinguishing Potlatch on the grounds that mitigation measures 
were not being implemented, as the court of appeals suggested in 
Boise Cascade, was at best unpersuasive.337
V. THE TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS RENEWED—BOISE CASCADE IN THE 
SUPREME COURT
A. Arguments of the Parties
MPCA petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to review the 
court of appeals’ decision in Boise Cascade because the intermediate 
appellate court’s opinion “nullifies enacted legislative policies and 
activities, contradicts on-point judicial precedent, and fails to apply 
established judicial review standards.”338 As a result, MPCA
maintained that the case fulfilled the requirements for review.339
The supreme court agreed and granted MPCA’s petition.
In the supreme court, MPCA’s argument emphasized SFRA 
and the voluntary guidelines promulgated by the Forest Resources 
Council.  Because the court of appeals believed “that the voluntary 
mitigation measures enacted by the legislature in SFRA will not 
work,” the court required that MPCA conduct a project-specific
Under the circumstances, it was improper for the court to suggest that the GEIS 
was somehow “inaccurate.”
335. Potlatch EAW, supra note 129, at Attachment 4, 10-32 (Appellants’ 
Appendix at A-208 to A-230, Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (No. 
C5-97-391)); Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendices B, C, D, and E
(Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-124 to R-181, Boise Cascade,
644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
336. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix E (Respondent MCEA’s
Supreme Court Appendix at R-142 to R-181 Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
337. Even Bettison, in criticizing the Potlatch decision, termed the Boise Cascade
district court litigation “a sort of ‘[Potlatch II]’ that revisits many of the issues in 
[Potlatch].”  Bettison, supra note 208, at 1005 n.219.
338. MPCA’s Petition for Review of Decision of Court of Appeals at 1, Boise
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (C6-01-96).
339. Id., citing MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117, subd. 2(a).
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EIS.340  As a result, according to MPCA, the court of appeals 
“eviscerated” SFRA341 and effectively substituted its judgment for 
that of the agency.342  Because the legislature is “the ultimate public 
regulatory authority,” MPCA’s discussion of the mitigation
measures promulgated under SFRA’s “carefully crafted legislative 
scheme” satisfied MEPA’s requirement that a governmental entity 
consider mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority.343
MPCA also argued that the court of appeals’ decision “cannot be 
reconciled” with Potlatch, where the same court held that voluntary 
mitigation measures satisfied MEPA.344 In addition, MPCA
maintained that it discussed timber harvest mitigation measures 
even though MPCA and DNR “concluded in the first instance that 
the Boise project will not cause significant effects because, simply, 
the project is small.”345
MCEA responded that MEPA, not SFRA, controlled MPCA’s 
actions with respect to the Boise project.  Given that the Forest 
Resources Council does not perform a regulatory function, MCEA 
argued that the court of appeals correctly found SFRA could not 
compel implementation of the Council’s guidelines.346  As a result, 
there were no assurances that “mitigation measures are in place 
and effective,” and such voluntary mitigation did not comply with 
MEPA.347  MCEA also maintained that MPCA did not conduct the 
additional analysis that the EQB determined was necessary to rely 
upon the GEIS in reviewing the Boise project.348  Finally, MCEA 
alleged that “[t]he passage of time, the development of superior 
analytical methods, and MPCA’s failure to impose real mitigation 
requirements on Boise Cascade all differentiate” the case from 
Potlatch.349
340. MPCA’s Brief at 10, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (C6-01-
96).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 19-20.
343. Id. at 19.
344. Id. at 18-19.
345. Id. at 21.
346. MCEA’s Brief at 20-25, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (C6-
01-96).
347. Id. at 25, 33-39, 42-51.
348. Id. at 26-33.
349. Id. at 41-42.
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B. The Boise Cascade Supreme Court Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
holding that MPCA employed the GEIS appropriately under
MEPA.  MPCA relied upon DNR in evaluating the environmental 
effects of timber harvesting associated with the Boise project, and 
DNR determined that the GEIS adequately discussed such effects.
With respect to mitigation, the supreme court held that the court 
of appeals substituted its judgment for that of MPCA and DNR in 
determining the implementation and effectiveness of the Forest 
Resources Council’s guidelines.
Before analyzing the environmental issues, the supreme court 
clarified the appropriate standard of judicial review in evaluating
agency decisions on the need for an EIS under MEPA.  The court 
stated that the “decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a
presumption of correctness, and deference should be shown by the 
courts to the agencies’ expertise and their special knowledge in the 
field of their technical training, education, and experience.”350
According to the court, the legislature “codified the standard of 
review for [an] agency’s decisions in contested case proceedings in 
the Minnesota Administrative Procedures [sic] Act (MAPA) at 
Minn. Stat. § 14.69.”351  Although MPCA’s EIS decision was not the 
result of a contested case hearing, the court found MAPA’s
deferential standard of review appropriate because environmental 
review involves the “application of an agency’s expertise, technical 
training, and experience.”352  Accordingly, the court reviewed 
MPCA’s decision to determine whether it was “unsupported by 
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted or 
was arbitrary and capricious.”353
Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court easily 
rejected MCEA’s argument that MPCA failed to conduct the
additional analysis necessary to rely upon the GEIS.  The court 
found that DNR stated that the Boise project was of the type 
anticipated in the GEIS, and that MPCA properly relied upon 
DNR’s expertise in determining a project-specific EIS on timber 
harvesting was unnecessary.  The court, therefore, deferred “to the 
technical expertise of the MPCA and the DNR regarding the use 
350. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 463 (citing Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 
N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1988)).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 464.
353. Id.
53
Lightfoot: Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Minnesota Timber Harvesting
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL LIGHTFOOT POTLATCH.DOC 10/28/2002 10:51 PM
490 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
and application of the Forestry GEIS.”354
Mitigation issues proved more vexing.  The court focused on 
the requirement that MPCA consider, in determining whether the 
Boise project had the potential for significant environmental effect, 
the extent to which the project’s effects were “subject to mitigation 
by ongoing public regulatory authority.”355  According to the
supreme court, the court of appeals substituted its judgment for 
that of MPCA and DNR on the need for an EIS.  The court found 
that substantial evidence in the administrative record supported
MPCA’s decision.356  This evidence included confirmation that 
DNR and the United States Forest Service, owners of approximately 
one-third of the state’s forests, were actively implementing the 
Minnesota Forest Resource Council’s guidelines, as were Boise
Cascade Corporation and many county governments.357  As a result, 
the record confirmed MPCA’s conclusion that mitigation “will be 
in place before any increased harvesting is undertaken.”358
Turning to the “mandatory” or “voluntary” nature of
mitigation, the court declared that the parties’ focus on the
distinction was “somewhat misleading when the context of our 
review of the MPCA’s decision is recalled.”359  The EQB rules, 
opined the court, merely require that MPCA consider the extent to 
which ongoing public regulatory authority may mitigate a project’s 
environmental effects.360 In making an EIS decision, MPCA could 
review voluntary mitigation measures.361  More importantly, the 
court found that “the mitigation measures most relevant to this 
case” were the timber harvesting guidelines that the Forest
Resources Council promulgated under SFRA, and that “the
legislature required that those guidelines were to be voluntary.”362
Although it was “unable to find any requirement in our state’s 
law that the MPCA cannot consider voluntary measures in assessing 
mitigation,”363 the court found that MPCA did not rely solely upon 
voluntary compliance with the Council’s guidelines.  The Council 
354. Id. at 465 (citing Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 824).
355. Id. (quoting MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C) (1999)).
356. Id. at 466.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 467 (citing Potlatch, 569 N.W.2d at 218).
359. Id. at 467-68.
360. Id. at 468 (citing MINN. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(c) (1999)).
361. Id.
362. Id. (citing SFRA, MINN. STAT. § 89A.05, subd. 3 (2000)).
363. Id.
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“may lack any statutory or administrative enforcement mechanism 
or true regulatory authority,” but MPCA was capable of ensuring 
“that reasonable mitigation measures will be in place when the 
permit [for the Boise project] is issued.”364  MPCA, the court 
concluded, has the statutory authority to incorporate the Council’s 
relevant timber harvesting guidelines into permits that MPCA 
issues for the Boise project.365
Justice Paul H. Anderson concurred in the majority opinion, 
identifying a “weakness” that he perceived “in the majority’s
mitigation analysis.”366  After a thorough review of the record, 
Justice Anderson rightly concluded that the majority erred in 
assuming that MPCA would include timber harvesting mitigation 
measures in permits issued for the Boise Cascade project.  MPCA 
staff, Justice Anderson explained, stated in testimony on the Boise 
EAW that the agency often includes measures to mitigate air and 
water pollution as permit conditions, but it never incorporates the 
Forest Resources Council’s guidelines into MPCA permits.367
Justice Anderson acknowledged that the majority relied upon 
timber harvest “mitigation measures implemented and enforced by 
the United States Forest Service (USFS), the DNR, and certain 
Minnesota counties,” and noted that MPCA’s discussion of such 
measures constituted “more than a scintilla of evidence in the 
record that the MPCA did, in fact, consider the extent to which the 
effects of the project were subject to mitigation by ongoing public 
regulatory authority.”368 However, Justice Anderson observed
“MPCA did not address these measures as part of its specific 
findings on mitigation and presumably did not base its final
decision on them.”369  Given MAPA’s deferential standard of review 
364. Id. at 467.
365. Id.  The court accurately observed that the Boise Cascade project would 
require MPCA to amend the facility’s air operating permit under Title V of the 
Clean Air Act, and to authorize construction of the modified facility under the 
Clean Air Act’s prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) program. Id. at 
467, n.9.  Although the court states that MPCA would issue two permits, for such 
modifications MPCA actually issues a single air emissions permit that consolidates
the PSD construction authorization and the authority to operate under Title V.
See MPCA Boise Cascade EAW Findings, supra note 250, at 11 (Respondent
MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-211, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 
2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
366. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 469 (Anderson, J., concurring).
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Justice Anderson filed a concurring opinion rather than a dissent, 
but expressed the hope that when deciding issues as important as 
the Boise Cascade project “MPCA would provide a stronger basis 
for its decision than was done here.”370
C. Evaluating the Supreme Court Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Boise Cascade opinion
reiterates the proper role of judicial review under MEPA. Boise
Cascade reinforces the proposition that when an agency adheres to 
MEPA’s procedural dictates, a court must affirm the agency’s 
decision even though the court may have reached a different 
conclusion.371  Such judicial deference arises from constitutional 
separation of powers principles that bar the legislature from
delegating administrative acts to the judiciary.372  The supreme 
court properly determined that the court of appeals ignored the 
separation of powers doctrine and substituted its own judgment for 
that of MPCA. Boise Cascade reinforces the “need for exercising 
judicial restraint and for restricting judicial functions to a narrow 
area of responsibility lest [the court] substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency.”373
Boise Cascade also reverses an outcome inconsistent with the 
court of appeals’ decision on virtually identical facts in Potlatch.
Boise Cascade and Potlatch involved MPCA’s environmental review of 
expansion proposals for wood products facilities in northern
Minnesota.  In both cases, MPCA prepared EAWs and relied upon 
DNR recommendations that project-specific environmental impact 
statements on timber harvesting were unnecessary in light of the 
GEIS.  Both EAWs identified specific environmental effects and 
mitigation measures.374  In Potlatch, the court of appeals found that 
MPCA employed the GEIS properly and that the measures
implemented under SFRA constituted adequate mitigation for 
370. Id. at 470-71.
371. See Cable Communications Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Communications
P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668-69 (Minn. 1984); First Nat’l Bank v. Dep’t of
Commerce, 350 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. 1984); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 
N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1988) (all holding that when an agency engages in 
reasoned decision making, a court must affirm even though it may have reached a 
different conclusion had it been the fact finder).  The holding is consistent with 
federal case law under NEPA. See supra note 213.
372. Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 824.
373. Id. at 825.
374. See supra Part III.C.
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purposes of MEPA.  The court of appeals’ Boise Cascade decision, 
without offering a credible rationale to distinguish Potlatch,375 held 
that MEPA required a project-specific environmental impact
statement to evaluate the effects of timber harvesting.  By reversing 
the court of appeals, the supreme court harmonized the two 
decisions and provided valuable guidance on applying the GEIS in 
conducting environmental review of specific projects.  Moreover, 
the supreme court’s decision may serve as a guide to other
governmental entities regarding the use of the timber harvesting 
GEIS and other generic environmental impact statements that
address activities with regional or statewide effects.376
The supreme court’s decision in Boise Cascade also is important 
because it represents the court’s first attempt to construe SFRA.  In 
so doing, the court accurately declared that “the mitigation
measures most relevant to this case are the timber management
guidelines promulgated by the MFRC [Minnesota Forest Resources
Council] under the SFRA,” and that the legislature specified that 
the guidelines were voluntary.377  The court’s careful attention to 
the legislature’s intent in enacting SFRA is particularly appropriate 
in the context of environmental review, given that the legislature 
may pass project-specific measures that modify MEPA’s
procedures378 or altogether exclude projects from environmental 
375. See supra Part IV.C.
376. The EQB rules require responsible governmental units to use the
information in a generic EIS in project-specific review under MEPA if the generic 
EIS remains adequate at the time a specific project is subject to review. See supra 
notes 39-41 and accompanying text.  The timber harvesting GEIS is currently the 
only final generic EIS in Minnesota.  The EQB is working to complete a generic
EIS on animal agriculture that will assess the statewide environmental effects of 
animal feedlots. Final GEIS Policy Document Nearly Finished, GEIS UPDATE (Minn. 
Envtl. Quality Bd., St. Paul, Minn.), Jan. 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/eqb/geis/GEIS%20Update%20Jan%202002b.pd
f (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).  The EQB also prepared a final scoping document for 
a generic EIS on urban development in Minnesota, but the legislature has yet to 
provide the EQB with funding to conduct that generic EIS. See MINNESOTA
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD, FINAL SCOPING DOCUMENT, GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STUDY ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN MINNESOTA
(2000), available at
http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/eqb/pdf/UDGEISScopingDocFinal.PDF (last
visited Aug. 6, 2002).  Telephone Interview with George Johnson, GEIS Project 
Manager, Environmental Quality Board (Aug. 6, 2002).
377. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 467.
378. See In re Am. Iron & Supply Co., 604 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000) (Minnesota legislature passed a statute requiring that MPCA conduct an 
EAW on a metal shredding facility to determine whether an EIS was necessary, 
even though the project did not meet or exceed a mandatory EAW threshold 
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review.379
In addition, Boise Cascade is significant because it confirms that 
the standard of review under MAPA applies to agency decisions 
even if an agency does not hold a contested case proceeding.
MAPA section 14.69, which the supreme court construed,
establishes the “scope of judicial review” for “contested cases”380
under sections 14.63 through 14.68.381  MPCA’s decision on the 
need for a project-specific EIS did not involve a contested case, but 
the supreme court concluded that MAPA’s standard of review 
nonetheless applied on the grounds of separation of powers.
Quoting Reserve Mining,382 the supreme court declared it was a 
“bedrock separation of powers principle that the legislature may 
not delegate to the courts duties which are essentially
administrative in character.”383 Because environmental review
requires agencies to apply technical expertise, the court found 
MAPA’s standard of review appropriate.384  At least one court of 
appeals decision involving environmental review relied upon
MAPA,385 but Boise Cascade appears to be the first decision in which 
the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly states that MAPA applies 
to decisions by responsible governmental units under MEPA.
under MINN. R. 4410.4300).
379. See supra note 45. 
380. As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized, a “contested case” is a 
proceeding before an administrative agency “in which the legal rights, duties, or 
privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be 
determined after an agency hearing.” MINN. STAT. § 14.02, subd. 3 (2000). See also
Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464 n.8.  A contested case hearing is an adversarial
proceeding before an administrative law judge, with the right of the parties to 
cross-examine witnesses and offer rebuttal evidence. MINN. STAT. § 14.60, subds. 1-
4 (2000).  During the proceeding, the administrative law judge receives probative 
evidence, applies privileges recognized by law, and may exclude evidence on the 
grounds that it is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitious. Id. at subd. 
2.
381. MINN. STAT. § 14.69 (2000) (stating that in a judicial review under section
14.63-.68, the court may affirm the agency decision, remand the case for further 
proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision).
382. 256 N.W.2d at 824.
383. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
384. Id.
385. See In re Univ. of Minn., 566 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing 
MAPA as the applicable standard of review in evaluating whether the university
violated MEPA procedure by entering into a contract that might prejudice the
ultimate decision on a project before determining that a final EIS was adequate).
Bettison mistakenly concludes that the Minnesota Court of Appeals has never 
relied upon MAPA “in the environmental review setting.”  Bettison, supra note 
208, at 981-82.
58
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/13
FINAL LIGHTFOOT POTLATCH.DOC 10/28/2002 10:51 PM
2002] THE MINNESOTA TIMBER HARVESTING GEIS 495
Although the opinion provides useful guidance on the
standard of review under MEPA and the use of the GEIS, the 
majority in Boise Cascade errs in asserting that MPCA permits could 
incorporate timber harvesting mitigation measures.  As Justice 
Anderson correctly observes in his concurring opinion, MPCA has 
never incorporated timber harvesting mitigation measures into the 
agency’s permits. 386  Staff testimony before the agency’s Citizen 
Board during the Boise Cascade environmental review process also 
suggests MPCA has no intention of instituting such a practice.387
Integrating the Forest Resources Council’s voluntary timber 
management guidelines into air or water permits would exceed 
MPCA’s statutory mandate.  MPCA’s authority extends to meeting 
“problems related to water, air and land pollution in the areas of 
the state affected thereby . . .”388  DNR’s powers and duties entail 
the “charge and control of all the public lands, parks, timber, waters, 
minerals, and wild animals of the state and the use, sale, leasing, or 
other disposition thereof . . .”389  If MPCA incorporated timber 
harvesting and forest management guidelines into a permit
regulating air emissions or water discharges, the agency would 
surpass its grant of authority from the legislature and encroach 
upon DNR’s powers.  Under MAPA, an agency that exceeds its 
statutory jurisdiction acts unlawfully.390
Of equal importance, an MPCA permit that includes the 
Forest Resources Council’s guidelines as regulatory directives is 
inconsistent with SFRA.  The Minnesota legislature could have 
adopted a command and control regulatory program, complete 
with a permit system and judicial enforcement, in response to the 
GEIS. Instead, the legislature adhered to the policy
recommendations of the GEIS and enacted SFRA, a statute
authorizing the promulgation of voluntary timber management 
guidelines.  Including the Council’s voluntary guidelines as
386. Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d at 470 (Anderson, J., concurring).
387. See id. (quoting a member of MPCA’s environmental review staff stating 
that “we have not advocated carrying those [timber harvesting guidelines] over 
into permits”).
388. MINN. STAT. § 116.01 (2000).
389. MINN. STAT. § 84.027, subd. 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
390. MINN. STAT. § 14.69(b) (2000). See also Cable Communications Bd. v. 
Nor-West Cable Communications P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn.
1984)(stating that “[a]gencies are not permitted to act outside the jurisdictional 
boundaries of their enabling acts”); Gibson v. Civil Serv. Bd., 171 N.W.2d 712, 715 
(Minn. 1969)(stating that an appellate court may reverse an agency decision 
“where it appears the agency has not kept within its jurisdiction”).
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enforceable terms in MPCA permits is diametrically opposed to the 
legislative intent that SFRA embodies.  Such conduct would also 
run counter to the state’s regulatory policy, which declares agencies 
must avoid “overly prescriptive and inflexible” programs that
increase “costs to the state, local governments, and the regulated 
community and decreas[e] the effectiveness of the regulatory 
program.”391
Justice Anderson’s concurring opinion offers cogent and
persuasive analysis in all but one respect.  The opinion incorrectly 
declares that MPCA “presumably did not base its final decision on” 
the timber harvesting mitigation measures implemented and
enforced by the United States Forest Service, DNR, and Minnesota 
county governments.392  MPCA failed to specifically articulate in its 
mitigation findings on the Boise EAW that it was relying upon 
implementation of such measures.393  However, Appendix B to the 
Boise EAW, which MPCA’s findings reference,394 notes that the 
entities committed to meeting or exceeding the Forest Resources 
Council’s guidelines own approximately seventy-five percent of the 
timber estimated to provide the additional wood for Boise
Cascade’s project.395  The administrative record, therefore, clearly 
establishes that MPCA considered United States Forest Service, 
DNR, Boise Cascade Corporation, and county implementation of 
timber harvesting mitigation in determining that a project-specific
EIS was unnecessary.  Justice Anderson accurately observes that 
MPCA’s findings could have been more explicit, but the
391. MINN. STAT. § 14.002 (2000).
392. 644 N.W.2d at 470.
393. See MPCA Boise Cascade EAW Findings, supra note 250, at 9-11 (Supreme 
Court Appendix of Respondent MCEA at R-209 to R-211, Boise Cascade, 644 
N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)) (stating that the cumulative effects of 
timber harvesting are subject to “ongoing implementation of programmatic
mitigation measures authorized under the Minnesota Sustainable Forest
Resources Act,” and referencing findings that discuss SFRA).
394. Id. at 10 (Respondent MCEA’s Supreme Court Appendix at R-210 Boise 
Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) (No. C6-01-96)).
395. Boise EAW, supra note 219, at Appendix B at 8 (Respondent MCEA’s 
Supreme Court Appendix at R-131, Boise Cascade, 644 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 2002) 
(No. C6-01-96)).  The entities include Boise Cascade Corporation, estimated to 
own twenty-three percent of the wood; the United States Forest Service, estimated
to own eight percent; DNR and other state agencies, estimated to own twenty-four
percent, and county governments, estimated to own twenty percent.  Private 
sources own the remaining twenty-five percent. Id.  Because individual owners 
may sell to loggers who implement the guidelines, in excess of seventy-five percent 
of the wood harvested for the Boise Cascade project may be cut by loggers 
complying with the Council’s forest management practices.
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administrative record contradicts the assertion that MPCA failed to 
rely upon evidence documenting statewide implementation of 
timber harvesting mitigation measures.396
VI. CONCLUSION
The state of Minnesota spent nearly five years and $875,000 in 
assessing the cumulative effects of timber harvesting in the GEIS.
In Potlatch, the court of appeals reviewed the first application of the 
GEIS to project-specific environmental review and held that MPCA 
used the GEIS as envisioned in MEPA.  The second application of 
the GEIS, however, proved more problematic.  Ignoring Potlatch
and the intent of the legislature, the court of appeals in its ill-
conceived Boise Cascade decision held that MPCA’s application of 
the GEIS violated MEPA, and that the Boise project required an 
environmental impact statement on timber harvesting despite the 
state’s extensive earlier study and the EQB’s decision that MPCA 
must use that study in analyzing the Boise project.
As this article demonstrates, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
rectified the court of appeals’ error by reversing that court’s Boise
Cascade decision, and holding that the administrative record
supported MPCA’s decision not to require an environmental
impact statement.  In so doing, the Minnesota Supreme Court
employed the correct judicial review standard, and reaffirmed the 
court of appeals’ analysis in Potlatch.  Despite the inaccuracies in 
the majority’s opinion and Justice Anderson’s concurrence, the 
Boise Cascade decision offers essential insights on the application of 
the GEIS.  It should serve as an effective guide for MPCA and other 
governmental entities in evaluating future projects under MEPA.
396. See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text. See also Boise Cascade, 644 
N.W.2d at 466 (stating that “the record indicates that the DNR and the United 
States Forest Service (USFS), who own approximately one-third of all forested land 
in Minnesota, are actively implementing mitigation measures,” and “[t]he record 
also indicates application of similar measures on certain county and federal
lands”).
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